Hegemonic Pluralism and Imperialistic Use of Language in Postcolonial and Post-Empire Africa

Conflict-Model Political Arrangement in Postcolonial and Post-Empire Africa: The Nature of State Formation and Marginalized Identity in Language and Culture

Dr. Eshete Gemeda

University of Southern Denmark

                      The State Defined

          Modern institutions are characteristically different from traditional forms of social order in respect of their dynamism and quality, the degree to which they function and their global impact. Modernity radically alters traditional way of thinking and increases interconnections between peoples of the globe. These connections may reinforce both our collective and personal interests or complicate the beauty people share in common. “Even if distance and powerlessness do not inevitably go together, the emergence of globalized connections, together with high consequence risks, represent parameters of social life over which the situated individual has relatively little control” (Giddens, 2009: 192). As Giddens has argued, globalization concerns the intersection of presence and absence, the interlacing of social events and social relations at distance with local context. The physical presence is contrasted by absence and correspondingly, local context is contrasted by social relations at distance. These contradictory intersections characterize globalization theory and the high-consequence risks. Global modernity or the post-traditional order is sometimes viewed as a risk transition in a sense that what is expected to be positive outcome and constructive often turns out to be negative and disastrous.

          What makes human beings different from other animals is their socialization character and the conscious social activities take place in an organized, systematic and planned manner. This leads us to the point concerning the way people bring their brainpower together to have control over their lives and their territories. The organized way of operating in a defined territory may be encapsulated as ‘the state.’ In the functional terms, the state is defined by different scholars on the basis of their ideological backgrounds, although the general dictionary definition may remain universal. Different interpretations of the state, therefore, provide us broad accounts of its formation, development and functions. In sociological terms, the state is understood both as the government and the complex organizations that enable the social fabrics to function effectively. In a standard sense, the state refers to an organized political community of a country controlled by one government. This organized social force is characterized by civil servants, tax collectors, police, national army and diplomats that are empowered by constitution. Government as the state machinery may be viewed as a particular system wherein an organized group of people control a country or a state. The state, therefore, constitutes functionally defined institutions and organizations that accomplish governmental tasks within their power. These tasks include: maintaining law and order, the management of external affairs or relations through diplomacy, policy-making and planning, the enforcement of law, taxation and political representations through parliamentary bodies and political parties (see Giddens 2009).

          The authority, power and control differ from country to country depending on the nature of the state. In the totalitarian states where power is tightly centralized, the authorities are unchecked. The monopoly of the use of force enables them not merely to mobilize and manipulate the people, but also control their mental universe. Here, the authoritative thinking generates unbridgeable power boundary (distance) between members of the pyramid and the grass-roots. Conversely, in an egalitarian state, devolution is highly exercised and the system of decentralizing power facilitates a strong sense of self-assurance. The liberal state thus focuses on building a self-contained society capable of controlling its own destiny. The two kinds of states are characteristically antagonistic; the former reactionary and stagnant, the latter revolutionary and dynamic.

Postcolonial Identity and Language Situation: Hegemonic State

and Power Deficit

          Modern monolingual theorists and the blanket theory they pursue picture/portray forced unity and unnatural singularism as perfect scientific paradigm, which bind diverse people together as a stable and unified political entity. Monolingual universalism approach in ethno-linguistic diversity is the falsification and misinterpretation of language issues. It merely focuses on the importance of superficial commonness and ignores narrower natural human attachment (attachment to one’s origin) without which broader human relations and a sense of universal brotherhood cannot be achieved. It seems problematic to try to talk about the distant world before teaching people how to know themselves better, understand their own root and  their own way which empower them to develop critical thinking and have a clear image of the world around them. In a developing world, like Africa, where monolingual theoreticians focus on the issue of bringing the distant world together by preventing or discouraging those who want to begin with building their own world and their own homes, a truly global solidarity of nations can never happen. Here lies the controversy of this theory. It has fallen through to explicate fully the theory of universalism and the concept of language efficiency in a contemporary pluralistic situation.

         Human beings express their many attachments in different ways, pursue a variety of goals to attain both wider (broader) and narrow linguistic rights and rewards at various times of their life spans; but these noble goals are frequently frustrated by monolingual politics, which views all positive options and desires as destructive. Within a broader context of structural inequalities of hegemonic states, monolingual universalism contributes to ethnocentrism and modern linguistic racism. Human accumulative experience, including repertoire variety, has been profoundly affected by this theory of restrictive parochialism, which stresses mechanical oneness of people and their languages in the name of universalism or global convergence.

          Language policy is the reflection of the state. In a conflict model multinational state, the ruling élite pursues the principle of partisan, and so does its language planning. Very often, languages and cultures of the ruling groups play the dominant role and enjoy higher status and power, in much the same way as members of the pyramid themselves, whereas other languages and cultures are partially or totally disempowered or paralysed by the ‘exclusionary theory of Otherness.’

Language planning is a government’s authorised, long-term, sustained and conscious effort to alter a language’s function in a society….Language policies, therefore, can promote, prescribe, discourage…the use of language and thereby empower or disempower speakers of languages by giving higher or lower status to their languages. Language policies are guided by particular ideologies or ultimate goals (Heine, 2000: 340-341).

Our ability to explore soberly the nature of states in a contemporary world enables us to devise a successful language policy and any kind of development at large. Time changes; and so does a society; and with the changing of a society, language politics also changes. The development or stagnant lifestyle of people is, therefore, the result of the direction of the changing political scenes and the nature of the states. The language planning a state pursues may help the nation move forward in peace and harmony or may bring about division, violence and disintegration. The longstanding language problems in Sub-Saharan Africa are the reflection of colonial legacy of state formation. The ideology of violence has its root in the characteristic of a plural society and the nature of the formation of the state. The complex patterns of pluralism are reduced to the simple inversion of dialectical opposition if language, culture and humanity are dichotomized between the free and the unfree. For instance, in the postcolonial environment, the state is not merely undemocratic, but also functions as a dividing wall in the antagonistic relations of the two opposing camps, the dominant and the dominated, and this frequently generates irreconcilable contradictions and violence. For instance, the decolonization periods in Africa (1945-1960) were attended by violence because the issue of decolonization essentially demands the complete change of role relationships.

I will accept…the assumption that men have to be forced from positions of dominance, that they will not relinquish or share power they have once enjoyed. Rationalizations that dehumanize the subject peoples and glorify the civilized mission of their overlords justify ready recourse to repression and force (Kuper, 1969: 159).

Kuper has emphasized that the use of force is encouraged by the greater development of political institutions and the generations of disproportionate positional power. The empirical evidence for the inevitability of violence is more convincing in all settler societies where the empowered linguistic minorities exercise domination over the majority population and other disempowered minority groups. The theoretical argument for the necessity of violence as an instrument of change rests on the nature of the state. “The moral justification for violence derives from oppression and humiliation, from the transparency of the connection between the good fortune of those who rule and the misery of those who are ruled, and from the concepts of human and the rights of man” (ibid., p. 154). National renaissance, national liberation, the restoration of nation-hood, whatever the headings may be the struggle against totalitarianism is always a violent phenomenon.

          The ideology of fixities in the continent does not allow any broad alternatives which reverse the unnatural way of putting peoples and their languages together. In order for the African states to function as truly independent states, it is necessary to change the anachronistic ruling strategy imposed on them by ex-colonial powers. This means the true freedom of Africans and their languages cannot happen as long as totalitarian sovereignty dictates the democratic way of looking at African politics of national unity. I think African scholars need to redefine modern African states and the unnatural unification programme created by them.

Most of the new states [refers to states of the developing nations] come into existence without that unity of sentiment, geography, administrative organization, language and cultural tradition that is taken for granted as the basis of nationhood in the more settled states. Japan and Korea, with their relatively homogeneous population sharing the same language, culture and tradition come closest to the Western conception of the nation-state. But even an enduring historic entity like China, was not so much a nation-state in the modern sense as a multi-national empire with a central core of Han people and a periphery of tributary states (Fishman, 1968: 453).

As we probe into the history of colonialism in Africa, modern African states are more or less the multi-national empire states which are the creation of ex-colonial powers. Their geographical limits have been determined by these powers. In some cases, due to injustice and irreconcilable contradictions between the dominant group and the people held together by force, the permanence of the boundary limits may not always be guaranteed (example, Eritrea and Ethiopia). Language as most valuable possession needs scientific planning, and this planning is the only alternative to solve the crisis of language politics in the modern world.

The absence of system analysis of language problem and language policy in individual languages, and the failure to identify explicitly constants across the boundaries of individual languages are closely connected with the absence of attempts to formulate a general theory in the study of this field. Difficulties begin with the concepts of problems, policy and language. The descriptive level is confused with the prescriptive one. There is no model on which a systematic description may be passed. And prescriptive far more frequently belongs to the sphere of actual politics than the sphere of political science (ibid; p. 285).

 In language planning and policy, studying language typology as well as identifying the principles, which govern this study are one of the primary tasks of the planners. Of these principles, development and democratization need to be emphasised. The effectiveness and failure of the language policy are appropriately evaluated by the characteristic features of planning and their contribution to the cultural, social and economic development of the people concerned. It is of great importance to asses how far the intended policy has favoured the creation of equal opportunity and smooth solidarity of the diversified groups.

         In plural countries, language planning may be fair if two or more languages are granted a status of official language; and this is at least an indication of the recognition of the importance of multi-lingual and multicultural principles. In African situation, however, language policies of most of the states do not recognize this approach. Even if two or more languages are recognized as national official, the non-native languages, especially the foreign languages, always play a more decisive role than the native ones, which have ethnically, culturally, traditionally or religiously important values to African masses. In such a planning strategy, the right of the individuals and groups to strengthen varieties of the indigenous languages that have significant symbolic values to them is limited. It is limited in such a way that rewarding the imported languages and devaluing or undermining the indigenous ones becomes apparent. Thus, the incentive to work hard to enrich the native languages is likely to be much less.

         In the study of the formation of a particular state, it is imperative to explore its distinctive characters. Sociolinguists recognize two types of states depending on the socio-economic and cultural development of different peoples of different countries: the nation-state or nationality-state (singularity-state or homogeneous) and multi-national state (plurality-state or heterogeneous). A country is called a nation-state or a nationality-state if the population of that country is homogeneous (a single ethnic group or homogeneous nationality-nation) having a single language and culture and has made its mother tongue the tool of government activities. As Fishman (1968: 69) has pointed out, “The singleness of the language indicates that we are dealing with a nation undivided [along different ethnic lines], that is, with a clearly dominant group which constitutes undisputed majority of the inhabitants.” The states of Western Europe are of this type. The stability, harmonious relations, peace, freedom, economic and technological advancement of this part of the world is mainly the result of natural homogeneity and democracy. In Africa, Somalia and Burundi are the only nationality-state where singularistic situation (common characteristic) occurs and where more than 90 percent of the populations are natives and the only national official language of the country is the language of this singular-ethnic majority. In homogeneous societies where national official languages are the mother tongues of the majority population (for example, Danish, German, Swedish, Norwegian, Japanese, Korea, Somali, Burundi, etc), the states are called nation-states. According to Heinz Kloss, these kinds of states are also called genuine nation-states and they are characteristically endoglossic states or homogeneous. An endoglossic country is a country where a native language of the majority (first language) is a national official of the state. On the contrary, exoglossic state or hegemonic state refers to a country where the dominant language of the minority (second language), especially the non-native one becomes an official language of the state. The two kinds of states are characteristically dissimilar and contradictory.

         A state is called a multi-national state if two or more languages are natively spoken by different ethnic groups in a country. It refers to a heterogeneous society where the freedom of languages is often threatened because of the oppressive nature of states and lack of scientific and genuine approach to national language planning. In such states, the emergence of authoritarian groups often creates power imbalance and linguistic injustice. The research of Heinz Kloss shows that nation-states are endoglossic states, whereas multi-national states are exoglossic states; and the two are functionally dissimilar. As already mentioned, the former refers to a country where the native official language is natively spoken by the majority of the population; and the latter shows a country in which the national official language is either imported or selected from among the minorities and imposed. The dominant group whose language is used as a tool of mental control by no means represents the majority population in the country. A country can either be Part-exoglossic state or all-exoglossic state (Kloss 1968 & 1969). In the former, we find the joint use of languages for national or official functions in the country-that is, the use of English, French, Spanish, or Portuguese in combination with one, two or more indigenous languages (for example, former British and French colonies of Africa and Asia). In such states, foreign languages (hereafter ex-colonial languages) dominate or even play the role of eliminating the indigenous languages. In the case of all-exoglossic situation or colonial model environment, none of the indigenous languages serves the purpose of nation-building (the purpose of national government). All-exoglossic in a  broader African historical context refers to colonial and post colonial language situation.

         Apart from endoglossic and exoglossic states, there are also other types that are more or less similar to all-exoglossic nation-states (colonial type). According to Heinz Kloss, if the numerical strength or the total number of the native speakers of the ruling ethnic group is less than 70-80 percent-that is, if this ethnic group does not form the majority of the population in the country, such a state may be defined as segmental-based nation/nationality state or multinational state and submersion-based nation/nationality state or multinational state. The former refers to a dominant minority group within a larger group of people, whereas the latter shows the oppressive character of a state.

…the 5 percent American Liberians… but consider either itself… or its language, or both, as symbols and safeguards of the nations at a large identity…. Nation-states belonging to this second category may be called section-based because members of the ethnic group claiming a privileged status for themselves or their languages are not sufficiently numerous to automatically represent the nation as a whole….In a majority of cases, the ethnic group speaking the dominant language has formerly subjugated the other ethnic groups, some examples are the Amhara in Ethiopia, the Afro-Americans now ruling Liberia, and the Spaniards whose tongue dominates public life in Bolivia. These groups have defeated and conquered those ethnic groups who to this very day have preserved their own languages and who still form the majority of the population (Fishman, 1968; 72).

Both the Section-based nation-states/nationality-states and Subjection-based nation-states/ nationality-states are characteristically oppressive, and especially in the case of the former, the ruling groups have no attachment and allegiance to the bulk of the population of the country. In most cases, the national official language is automatically the language of the dominant minority. The Americo-Liberians who were ruling Liberia and the Amhara (Semites from the North) in Ethiopia, were the two uniquely formed states protected and empowered by the ex-colonial powers of Europe; and were characteristically different from other African states. Thus, the modern Ethiopian empire-state of Haile-Sellasie and Mengistu is characteristically exoglossic nationality-state in a sense that both the constitution and language policy declare the dominance of a single language (Amharic) in the country. In this kind of state formation where the only recognized tool of national official purpose is an imposed language, the equality of several languages is unthinkable because the conquerors believe that running the government and business activities without the predominance of Amharic is impossible. Moreover, putting several languages on a fully equal level of freedom is assumed to be dangerous for they jeopardize the activities of the state; and thus, the ruling politicians opt for the recognition of the national status symbol of languages of polarization, without which the oppressive institutions cannot function as powerful arm of the state.

The solution to the problems set up by the language barriers to education is far from easy, for it involves dealing with some of the most basic issues in school and the wider society it serves. For by its nature, language is a core factor in any education, for education depends on communication and verbal coding of human knowledge. Nor can dealing with language issues alone solve social problems. But until the existence of the language barriers to education have been recognized and their working carefully recognized, there is no chance of successful steps to overcome the barriers and provide equal educational opportunities for all (Spolsky, 1986: 188).

Language issues are central to human progress. The existence of language barriers to education does not only deter any sort of social transformation, but also disfigures human relations as a whole. Scrupulous and impartial language typology in a multiethnic society is of greater concern in the modern world because every successful step forward depends to a large extent on solving linguistic inequalities. In macro-level sociolinguistics, linguists often stress language situations (multilingualism, diglossic, exoglossic, endoglossic, etc.) and types of languages (creole, indigenous, imported or foreign, official, regional, local, etc.) in order to avoid language discrimination. Thus, typology of language as part of language planning deals with ‘language functions’ and a ‘theory of language building,’ and this includes the descriptive framework for the study of fair language distribution in plural situations, the explanation of change in language situations, language categories and numerical strength of the speakers of a particular language. A reasonable and feasible language policy grants the rights of individual members and groups of a society to equality of educational opportunity in their mother tongues.

         In dealing with language policy and planning, we have to take into account some crucial points such as the demarcation between ethnic and speech communities (a group of people sharing characteristic patterns of vocabulary, grammar and pronunciation), numerical strength of those speech communities, language variables (developmental status of language, juridical or legal status and statistical order) and the type of a state.

         In his study of Language-Nation Typology of the developing nations, Kloss has divided languages into six different developmental statuses and six juridical statuses, depending on the socio-economic transformational stage of each country. Though this approach may be less important to the developed nations, which have already completed this phase or stage of development, Kloss scientific study of language planning seems to be still a model reference to many plural countries of the developing world, especially Africa. The inflexible and unscientific planning paradigm we see in Ethiopia and other developing nations of Africa can be criticized, corrected or challenged only if we acquire a profound knowledge of language categories and the status symbol assigned to each language by each state.

         Heinz Kloss suggests that (see Fishman 1968: 78-84), language planning should involve the following developmental stages or categories:

A.    A language of modern science and technology, or in one sense, Language of Wider Communication (LWC-English) and European languages are classified as Matured Standardized Languages (highly advanced languages).

B.     When a language is unable to develop because of the smallness of the speech community and remained to be stagnant or excluded forever from the broader use of modern concepts, such language is said to be Small Group Standardized Language.

C.     The development of some languages may take place during pre-industrial civilization in which ancient literature, religious searching and philosophical writings might have been recorded and yet unsuitable for the teaching of modern science and/or technology (example of such languages may be ‘old Latin’ and Ethiopian ‘Ge’ez’). This kind of language according to Kloss is an ‘Archaic Language’ (a language no longer in use).

D.    If a language is recently standardized, and its modification or elaboration process is still in the earliest stage, or if it is used in mass education (literacy education) in a society, for

      religious and political purposes, or if it is used in teaching primary or secondary

      education, such developmental stage is referred to as ‘Young Standardized’ language.

 E.     In some cases, a language may be reduced only to recent writing, but its standardization has not 

       yet completed. This level of language is classified as ‘Unstandardized Alphabetized’ Language.

F.      If a language is spoken by the natives, but never or seldom used in writing, this language is classified as ‘Pre-literate’ language (verbal language).

With the exception of few languages, like Swahili, Somali, Amharic, Sesotho, Malagasy, Zulu, Xhosa, Kinyarwanda and Kirundi, which are closer to “A” level, almost all languages in Africa seem to have fallen under the categories of B, C, D, E or F.

         In a democratic multiethnic country (example, South Africa), the status symbol assigned to each language is quite encouraging. Conversely, in a totalitarian plural state, like Ethiopia, favouring and empowering language of the ruling minority is always the case.

         Depending on their level of development, Kloss also identifies the following six juridical status of languages: (1) The sole national official language; (2). Co-equal national official language or one among several official languages; (3) Regional official language; (4) Promoted language-the language which is accepted by authorities to be used in schools, libraries, may be printed as newspapers, advertisement, governmental reports, laws, or used in translating proclamations, etc., (5) Tolerated language-the language which is not promoted, that is, if its elaboration, cultivation, or further literary development is legally restricted except being used for religious purposes and in public gatherings; (6) Proscribed language-the language whose native speakers are legally deprived of the right to use it in their communal life is categorized under this status. The status of Oromo language (Oromiffa) during the period of Ethiopian constitutional monarchy and the communist Dergue can be categorized under number 6 (see also the figures on languages). The current juridical or constitutional status of Oromiffa is under category 3. In terms of developmental stages, it may be classified under number D.

Amharic is the only national official language in Ethiopia….Actually, however, the speakers of Amharic form 32 percent [this figure is exaggerated and is greater than the numerical strength of the native speakers of the same language by 4 percent after 19 years. See the statistics of Ethiopian nationalities of 1986]. The speakers of Gallah [Oromiffa], for example, are more numerous (44 percent) [this figure is greater than the number of the native speakers of the same  language by 14 percent after 19 years. See the statistics of the above mentioned year], than those of Amharic; yet their language falls under the proscribed languages (Fishman, 1968: 82).

Let us now examine the statistical method approach of modern language planning used by Kloss in order to identify the status of different language groups. Before taking some concrete examples, it is worth noticing the six standards of measurements for rank order (categories of numerical strength) of the native speakers of different languages.

I. Numerical Strength of the Native Speakers

90-100% (I)

70-89% (II)

40-69% (III)

20-39% (IV

-19% (V)

             Below 3% (VI)

For the convenience of thorough intelligibility of the combined symbols of tabulations, I have employed different signs: Roman Numbers (I, II, III, IV, V, VI), abbreviations (MsL, SgsL, AsL, YsL, UsL, PlL), alphabets (A, B, C, D, E, F) and Arabic Numbers (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) are used. The Roman Numbers stand for numerical category, the alphabets represent the stages of language development and the Arabic Numbers shows juridical or constitutional status.

II. Stages of Language Development (see previous definitions)

A. MsL- Mature standardized Language

B. SgsL- Small group standardized Language

C. AsL- Archaic standardized Language

D. YsL- Young standardized Language

E. UaL- Unstandardized alphabetized Language

F. PlL-Pre-literate Language

III. Constitutional or Juridical Status of Languages

1. SoL- The Sole official Language

2. CeL- Co-equal Language

3. RoL- Regional official Language 

4. PL- Promoted Language

5. TL- Tolerated Language

6. PrL-Proscribed Language

In order to understand the idea of numerical strength of the native speakers and combined symbol tabulations, I shall now try to illustrate the points with examples. Amharic is the mother tongue of 30 percent of the native speakers in Ethiopia. Oromiffa is the mother tongue of at least 55-60 percent of the native population in Ethiopia. In the table below, the status of Oromo language during the period of 1968, 1986 was 30-44%. Somali is natively spoken nearly by 90-100 percent of the population in Somalia. Thus, the linguistic characterization of the above languages can be analysed in the form of combined tabulation symbols (see next page).

Language planning is a government’s authorised, long-term, sustained and conscious effort to alter a language’s function in a society….Language policies, therefore, can promote, prescribe, discourage…the use of language and thereby empower or disempower speakers of languages by giving higher or lower status to their languages. Language policies are guided by particular ideologies or ultimate goals (Heine, 2000: 340-341). 

Status Symbols of Languages

Language	Country	Combined Symbols	Stage of Language Development	Numerical Strength/Total Number of Native Speaker	Juridical/ Constitutional Status
Amharic (During the periods of: 1910, 1952, 1968 & 1986)	Ethiopia	D1 (23%-55.5%-I)	Young Standard Language (D)	23%-55.5%	The Sole Official Language (1)
Oromiffa (During the periods of: 1910, 1952, 1968 and 1986)	Ethiopia	F6 (10.4%-44% -II)	Pre-literate Language (F)	18-%44%	Proscribed Language (6)

Oromiffa (After 1992)	Ethiopia	D3 (55%-60%-I)	Young Standard Language (D)	55%-60%	Regional Official Language (3)
Somali	Somalia	D1 (90%-100%-I)	Young Standard Language (D)	90%-100%	The Sole National Official Language (1)

Table 1: Developmental Status, Juridical/Constitutional Status, Numerical Strength/Total Number

              of Native Speakers and Language Group Categories

Source: Joshua A. Fishman. Language Problems of Developing Nations, 1968;

             Encyclopædia Britanica, Ready Reference and Index, 15th Edition, volume 3,

              973-1974; Institute of the Study of Ethiopian Nationalities, 1986.

             Encyclopædia Britanica, Ready Reference and Index, 15th Edition, volume 3,

              973-1974; Institute of the Study of Ethiopian Nationalities, 1986.

The State Classified

         As we examine this language characterization model, there are two types of countries; namely the endoglossic nationality-state and exoglossic nationality-state. For example, in the case of Somalia, the only national official language of the country is natively spoken by the majority population. At the same time, we see that the Somalis are homogeneous. Thus, Somalia is endoglossic nationality-state. This means that it is also one of the homogeneous nationality-state in Africa. In the case of Ethiopia, however, the national official language of the country (Amharic) is not natively spoken by majority of the indigenous population, the Oromo; but has become the sole national official language. Oromiffa, language of the majority population, is doomed to prohibition. After 1991, though the status of Oromiffa is relatively improved, it is still unable to play the role of national official purposes because of the undefined language policy in the country. As it has already been mentioned earlier, Amharic language is actually the language of the ruling Amhara, who ruled the country until 1991, and has been imposed on the majority population, the Oromo, and other minority groups without considering any other option. Therefore, feudal and communist Ethiopia is characteristically all-exoglossic nationality-state. It is a country where totalitarian sovereignty and monolingual politics have reduced the Oromo and their language not only to nominal existence, but also distorted the entire image of the marginalized nation.

Genuine/Endoglossic Nation-State/Nationality-State and

Section-based/Subjection-Based Nation-State/Nationality-State

Combined Symbols	Country’s Classification (Characteristic of a State)
1.   A+I+1 (AI1)	Genuine nation-state/nationality-state and Endoglossic nation-state/ nationality-state. A single-nationality-nation characterized by majority rule (language of the majority is national official).
2.   A+II+1 (AII1)	Minority-based (section-based) nation-state/nationality-state and Conflict-based (subjection-based) nation-state/nationality-state. A multilingual state characterized by minority rule (language of the minority is an official language).
3.   A+III+1 (AIII1)	Minority-based (section-based) nation-state/nationality-state and Conflict-based (subjection-based) nation-state/nationality-state. A multilingual state characterized by minority rule (language of the minority is an official language).
4.   A+IV+1 (AIV1)	Minority-based (section-based) nation-state/nationality-state and Conflict-based (subjection-based) nation-state/nationality-state. A multilingual state characterized by minority rule (language of the minority is an official language).
5.   A+V+1 (AV1)	Minority-based (section-based) nation-state/nationality-state and Conflict-based (subjection-based) nation-state/nationality-state. A multilingual state characterized by minority rule (language of the minority is an official language).
6.   D+I+1 (DI1)	Minority-based (section-based) nation-state/nationality-state and Conflict-based (subjection-based) nation-state/nationality-state. A multilingual state marked by minority rule (language of the minority is an official language).
7.   D+II+1 (DII1)	Minority-based (section-based) nation-state/nationality-state and Conflict-based (subjection-based) nation-state/nationality-state. A multilingual state characterized by minority rule (language of the minority is an official language).
8.   D+III+1 (DIII1)	Minority-based (section-based) nation-state/nationality-state and Conflict-based (subjection-based) nation-state/nationality-state. A multilingual state characterized by minority rule (language of the minority is an official language).

9.    D+IV+1 (DIV1)	Minority-based (section-based) nation-state/nationality-state and Conflict-based (subjection-based) nation-state/nationality-state. A multilingual state dominated by the minority (language of the minority is an official language).
10.   D+V+1 (DV1)	Minority-based (section-based) nation-state/nationality-state and Conflict-based (subjection-based) nation-state/nationality-state. A multilingual state marked by minority rule (language of the minority is an official language).

Table 1: Combined Status Symbols of Languages and Classification of States

Source: Joshua A. Fishman. Language Problems of Developing Nations, 1968.

          In developing nations of conflict model where traditional methods of ruling are exercised, great tradition often connotes ‘T. S. Eliot’s’ idea of the cultural and linguistic prestige of the dominant groups; and in a technical term to address a superior status, high values and importance of the tradition of empire-builders of the past. In terms of language policy, the idea of greatness is an intention to facilitate favourable condition for exercising dominance; and it is, therefore, necessary to avoid such ambiguity. The idea of having great tradition or without great tradition is basically contradictory to the modern concept of language planning and linguistic freedom because no nation is created without its own treasured values and qualities, though the hegemonic policy of Survival for the Fittest (Darwinian Theory) has promoted some groups to the level of masters and relegated the others to the level of subordination. In one sense, having or not having a great tradition in the context of prey and predator relations is an indication of appreciating inequality role relationships of people wherein those who are empowered continue enjoying lion’s share.

          In comparison to other developing nations, Africa is very much lagging behind the modern world mainly because of two reasons: first, lack of good governance and the problem of pacing up with the civilized world. Second, African scholars are unable to devise effective and democratic language policy. In general, the failure to meet the challenges in the continent has damaged African noble sentiment to bring about the development of African economy, languages and cultures. Africans have still clung themselves to the old colonial mannerisms and call for the adoption of the foreign languages and/or languages of the dominant groups as the national official by internalizing lower status given to them by the ex-colonial powers.

 For a while they [African nationalists] took pride in their command of the English language for reasons that were, paradoxically, nationalistic. But would not this put them English-speaking militants in the same category as Leopold Senghor with his affectionate attachment to the French language? And yet we have to describe Senghor’s Pride in the French language as at best a linguistic cosmopolitanism. What makes it possible for these early English-speaking Africans to be “nationalists” in spite of revelling in English language? (Fishman, 1968: 185).

This is a warning against imitative complex. Senghor believes that French is the supreme language of communication, rather than his own mother tongue. Some African intellectuals and scholars are still the prisoners of such wrong impressions. Education and the quality of intellect to many educated Africans simply mean the ability to speak and write English or French. Some Oromo scholars have also similar problems. It seems, however, self-diminishing for those intellectuals who assert their capacity by seeking solace and comfort in the non-native languages and cultures. The notion of clinging to languages of the dominant segments as the source of salvation, the most refined and valuable African asset is contrary to modern civilization, democracy, the principle of pluralistic moderation and nation-building. Africans cannot and will not grow better as long as they keep on fighting for the perpetual domination of languages of mental control. Most of all, whoever demonstrates a good command of foreign languages is always the best person to be rewarded. The traditional belief about language politics and the continuity of the admiration of the dominant tradition by the states have not only hampered the development of indigenous African languages, but also prevented the African masses from deciding their own destiny. Using the imposed languages as permanent features in Africa has resulted in prolonging neo-colonialism and dependency of all times.

From Japan: What is merely modern-as science and methods of organization-can be transported, but what is virtually human has fibres, so delicate and roots so numerous and far-reaching that it dies when moved from its soil. Japan…cannot be turned into a mere borrowed machine. She has her own soil which must assert itself over all…. Our Imperial Ancestors have founded our empire on a basis of broad and everlasting, and have deeply and firmly implanted virtue. Our subjects, ever united in loyalty and filial piety, have from generation to generation illustrated the beauty thereof. This is the glory of the fundamental character of our empire (Fishman, 1989: 138-139).Fishman (1985: 138) has also made similar remarks and said that the Arabs want modernization, but they have no desire to lose their own identity in the process.

         In order to function as a truly national symbol, a language has to win a willing acceptance of different ethnic groups of a country. “In India, English was supposed to be replaced by Hindi fifteen years after independence. However, because of vehement opposition by non-Hindi speaking groups, the requirement was suspended through the Language Legislation Act of 1967” (Bamgbose, 1991: 22). In a democratic type of language planning, the most important thing is to avoid the concept of imposing a language of a certain group arbitrarily on other people as a symbol of unity. This means without a genuine study of the function of languages, identity representation in education and culture can never happen. Hence, it is of vital significance to carry out a thorough scientific study of each language by means of using language development indices and other semantic dimensions. The scientific study of language must involve: orthography, dictionary, grammar, the total population of the native and non-native speakers of the language, literary and religious uses of the language and how far it is used as medium of instruction in schools (elementary, secondary or higher educational levels) and its strength of being used in mass media and publications (books, newspapers, letters, magazines, radio and television); its capacity to translate technological ideas and scientific terms in research; its level of standardization: mature standardized, adolescent, young standardized, reduced to the level of writing (only alphabetized), unalphabetized but spoken, etc (see W. Ferguson 1962, W. Stewart 1968, Heinz Kloss and Joshua A. Fishman, 1968). Besides this, what makes a language the ‘symbol of unity’ is whether or not that language is attached to the history, socio-cultural life, national identity and other values of the people concerned.

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