Conflict-Model Political Arrangement
in Postcolonial and Post-Empire Africa: The Nature of State Formation and Marginalized
Identity in Language and Culture
Dr. Eshete Gemeda
University of Southern Denmark
The State Defined
Modern institutions are
characteristically different from traditional forms of social order in respect
of their dynamism and quality, the degree to which they function and their
global impact. Modernity radically alters traditional way of thinking and increases
interconnections between peoples of the globe. These connections may reinforce
both our collective and personal interests or complicate the beauty people share
in common. “Even if distance and powerlessness do not inevitably go together,
the emergence of globalized connections, together with high consequence risks,
represent parameters of social life over which the situated individual has
relatively little control” (Giddens, 2009: 192). As Giddens has argued,
globalization concerns the intersection of presence
and absence, the interlacing of
social events and social relations at distance
with local context. The physical presence
is contrasted by absence and
correspondingly, local context is
contrasted by social relations at
distance. These contradictory intersections characterize globalization
theory and the high-consequence risks. Global modernity or the post-traditional order is sometimes
viewed as a risk transition in a sense that what is expected to be positive
outcome and constructive often turns out to be negative and disastrous.
What makes
human beings different from other animals is their socialization character and
the conscious social activities take place in an organized, systematic and
planned manner. This leads us to the point concerning the way people bring
their brainpower together to have control over their lives and their
territories. The organized way of operating in a defined territory may be
encapsulated as ‘the state.’ In the
functional terms, the state is defined by different scholars on the basis of their ideological backgrounds, although the general
dictionary definition may remain universal. Different interpretations of the
state, therefore, provide us broad accounts of its formation, development and
functions. In sociological terms, the state is understood both as the
government and the complex organizations that enable the social fabrics to
function effectively. In a standard sense, the state refers to an organized
political community of a country controlled by one government. This organized
social force is characterized by civil servants, tax collectors, police,
national army and diplomats that are empowered by constitution. Government as
the state machinery may be viewed as a particular system wherein an organized
group of people control a country or a state. The state, therefore, constitutes
functionally defined institutions and organizations that accomplish
governmental tasks within their power. These tasks include: maintaining law and
order, the management of external affairs or relations through diplomacy,
policy-making and planning, the enforcement of law, taxation and political
representations through parliamentary bodies and political parties (see Giddens
2009).
The authority, power and control differ from country to country
depending on the nature of the state. In the totalitarian states where power is
tightly centralized, the authorities
are unchecked. The monopoly of the use of force enables them not merely to
mobilize and manipulate the people, but also control their mental universe.
Here, the authoritative thinking generates unbridgeable power boundary (distance) between members of the pyramid and the
grass-roots. Conversely, in an
egalitarian state, devolution is highly exercised and the system of decentralizing power facilitates a
strong sense of self-assurance. The liberal state thus focuses on building a
self-contained society capable of controlling its own destiny. The two kinds of
states are characteristically antagonistic; the former reactionary and
stagnant, the latter revolutionary and dynamic.
Postcolonial Identity and Language
Situation: Hegemonic State
and Power Deficit
Modern
monolingual theorists and the blanket theory they pursue picture/portray forced
unity and unnatural singularism as
perfect scientific paradigm, which bind diverse people together as a stable and
unified political entity. Monolingual universalism approach in ethno-linguistic
diversity is the falsification and misinterpretation of language issues. It
merely focuses on the importance of superficial commonness and ignores narrower natural human
attachment (attachment to one’s origin) without which broader human relations
and a sense of universal brotherhood cannot be achieved. It seems problematic to try to talk
about the distant world before teaching people how to know themselves better,
understand their own root and their own way which empower them to
develop critical thinking and have a clear image of the world around them. In a developing world, like Africa, where
monolingual theoreticians focus on the issue of bringing the distant world
together by preventing or discouraging those who want to begin with building
their own world and their own homes, a truly global solidarity of nations can
never happen. Here lies the controversy of this theory. It has fallen
through to explicate fully the theory of universalism and the concept of
language efficiency in a contemporary pluralistic situation.
Human beings
express their many attachments in different ways, pursue a variety of goals to
attain both wider (broader) and narrow linguistic rights and rewards at various
times of their life spans; but these noble goals are frequently frustrated by
monolingual politics, which views all positive options and desires as
destructive. Within a broader context of structural inequalities of hegemonic
states, monolingual universalism contributes to ethnocentrism and modern
linguistic racism. Human accumulative experience, including repertoire variety,
has been profoundly affected by this theory of restrictive parochialism, which stresses mechanical oneness of
people and their languages in the name of universalism or global convergence.
Language
policy is the reflection of the state. In a conflict model multinational state,
the ruling élite pursues the principle of partisan, and so does its language
planning. Very often, languages and cultures of the ruling groups play the
dominant role and enjoy higher status and power, in much the same way as
members of the pyramid themselves, whereas other languages and cultures are
partially or totally disempowered or paralysed by the ‘exclusionary theory of
Otherness.’
Language planning is a
government’s authorised, long-term, sustained and conscious effort to alter a
language’s function in a society….Language policies, therefore, can promote, prescribe, discourage…the use of language and thereby empower or disempower speakers
of languages by giving higher or lower status to their languages. Language
policies are guided by particular ideologies or ultimate goals (Heine, 2000:
340-341).
Our ability to
explore soberly the nature of states in a contemporary world enables us to
devise a successful language policy and any kind of development at large. Time
changes; and so does a society; and with the changing of a society, language
politics also changes. The development or stagnant lifestyle of people is,
therefore, the result of the direction of the changing political scenes and the
nature of the states. The language planning a state pursues may help the nation
move forward in peace and harmony or may bring about division, violence and
disintegration. The longstanding language problems in Sub-Saharan Africa are
the reflection of colonial legacy of state formation. The ideology of violence
has its root in the characteristic of a plural society and the nature of the
formation of the state. The complex patterns of pluralism are reduced to the
simple inversion of dialectical opposition if language, culture and humanity
are dichotomized between the free and the unfree. For instance, in the
postcolonial environment, the state is not merely undemocratic, but also
functions as a dividing wall in the
antagonistic relations of the two opposing camps, the dominant and the
dominated, and this frequently generates irreconcilable contradictions and
violence. For instance, the decolonization periods in Africa (1945-1960) were
attended by violence because the issue of decolonization essentially demands
the complete change of role relationships.
I will accept…the assumption
that men have to be forced from positions of dominance, that they will not
relinquish or share power they have once enjoyed. Rationalizations that
dehumanize the subject peoples and glorify the civilized mission of their
overlords justify ready recourse to repression and force (Kuper, 1969: 159).
Kuper has emphasized that the use of force is encouraged by the greater development of political
institutions and the generations of disproportionate positional power. The
empirical evidence for the inevitability of violence is more convincing in all
settler societies where the empowered linguistic minorities exercise domination
over the majority population and other disempowered minority groups. The
theoretical argument for the necessity of violence as an instrument of change
rests on the nature of the state. “The
moral justification for violence derives from oppression and humiliation, from
the transparency of the connection between the good fortune of those who rule
and the misery of those who are ruled, and from the concepts of human and the
rights of man” (ibid., p. 154). National renaissance, national liberation,
the restoration of nation-hood, whatever the headings may be the struggle
against totalitarianism is always a violent phenomenon.
The ideology of fixities in the
continent does not allow any broad alternatives which reverse the unnatural way
of putting peoples and their languages together. In order for the African
states to function as truly independent states, it is necessary to change the
anachronistic ruling strategy imposed on them by ex-colonial powers. This means
the true freedom of Africans and their languages cannot happen as long as
totalitarian sovereignty dictates the democratic way of looking at African
politics of national unity. I think African scholars need to redefine modern
African states and the unnatural unification programme created by them.
Most of the new states
[refers to states of the developing nations] come into existence without that unity of sentiment, geography,
administrative organization, language and cultural tradition that is taken for
granted as the basis of nationhood in the more settled states. Japan and
Korea, with their relatively homogeneous population sharing the same language,
culture and tradition come closest to the Western conception of the nation-state. But even an enduring historic entity like China, was not so
much a nation-state in the modern sense as a multi-national empire with a
central core of Han people and a periphery of tributary states (Fishman, 1968:
453).
As we probe into the history of colonialism in Africa, modern
African states are more or less the multi-national
empire states which are the creation of ex-colonial powers. Their
geographical limits have been determined by these powers. In some cases, due to
injustice and irreconcilable contradictions between the dominant group and the
people held together by force, the permanence of the boundary limits may not
always be guaranteed (example, Eritrea and Ethiopia). Language as most valuable
possession needs scientific planning, and this planning is the only alternative
to solve the crisis of language politics in the modern world.
The absence of system
analysis of language problem and language policy in individual languages, and
the failure to identify explicitly constants across the boundaries of
individual languages are closely connected with the absence of attempts to
formulate a general theory in the study of this field. Difficulties begin with
the concepts of problems, policy and language. The descriptive level is confused with the prescriptive one. There is no model on which a systematic
description may be passed. And prescriptive far more frequently belongs to the
sphere of actual politics than the sphere of political science (ibid; p. 285).
In language planning and policy, studying language typology
as well as identifying the principles, which govern this study are one of the
primary tasks of the planners. Of these principles, development and
democratization need to be emphasised. The effectiveness and failure of the
language policy are appropriately evaluated by the characteristic features of
planning and their contribution to the cultural, social and economic
development of the people concerned. It is of great importance to asses how far
the intended policy has favoured the creation of equal opportunity and smooth
solidarity of the diversified groups.
In plural
countries, language planning may be fair if two or more languages are granted a
status of official language; and this is at least an indication of the
recognition of the importance of multi-lingual and multicultural principles. In
African situation, however, language policies of most of the states do not
recognize this approach. Even if two or more languages are recognized as
national official, the non-native languages, especially the foreign languages,
always play a more decisive role than the native ones, which have ethnically, culturally, traditionally
or religiously important values
to African masses. In such a planning strategy, the right of the
individuals and groups to strengthen varieties of the indigenous languages that
have significant symbolic values to
them is limited. It is limited in such a way that rewarding the imported
languages and devaluing or undermining the indigenous ones becomes apparent.
Thus, the incentive to work hard to enrich the native languages is likely to be
much less.
In
the study of the formation of a particular state, it is imperative to explore
its distinctive characters. Sociolinguists recognize two types of states
depending on the socio-economic and cultural development of different peoples
of different countries: the nation-state
or nationality-state (singularity-state or homogeneous) and multi-national state (plurality-state or
heterogeneous). A country is called a nation-state or a nationality-state if
the population of that country is homogeneous
(a single ethnic group or homogeneous nationality-nation) having a single
language and culture and has made its mother tongue the tool of government
activities. As Fishman (1968: 69) has pointed out, “The singleness of the
language indicates that we are dealing with a nation undivided [along different
ethnic lines], that is, with a clearly dominant group which constitutes
undisputed majority of the inhabitants.” The states of Western Europe are of
this type. The stability, harmonious relations, peace, freedom, economic and
technological advancement of this part of the world is mainly the result of natural homogeneity and democracy. In Africa, Somalia and Burundi are the only nationality-state where singularistic situation (common
characteristic) occurs and where more than 90 percent of the populations are
natives and the only national official language of the country is the language
of this singular-ethnic majority. In homogeneous societies where
national official languages are the mother tongues of the majority population
(for example, Danish, German, Swedish, Norwegian, Japanese, Korea, Somali,
Burundi, etc), the states are called nation-states.
According to Heinz Kloss, these kinds of states are also called genuine nation-states and they are characteristically endoglossic states or homogeneous. An endoglossic country is a country where a native language of the
majority (first language) is a national official of the state. On the contrary,
exoglossic state or hegemonic state refers to a country where the dominant
language of the minority (second language), especially the non-native one
becomes an official language of the state. The two kinds of states are
characteristically dissimilar and contradictory.
A
state is called a multi-national state if two or more languages are natively
spoken by different ethnic groups in a country. It refers to a heterogeneous society where the freedom
of languages is often threatened because of the oppressive nature of states and
lack of scientific and genuine approach to national language planning. In such
states, the emergence of authoritarian groups often creates power imbalance and
linguistic injustice. The research of Heinz Kloss shows that nation-states are endoglossic states, whereas multi-national
states are exoglossic states; and the two are functionally
dissimilar. As already mentioned, the former refers to a country where the
native official language is natively spoken by the majority of the population;
and the latter shows a country in which the national official language is
either imported or selected from among the minorities and imposed. The dominant
group whose language is used as a tool of mental control by no means represents the majority population in the country. A
country can either be Part-exoglossic
state or all-exoglossic state
(Kloss 1968 & 1969). In the former, we find the joint use of languages for
national or official functions in the country-that is, the use of English,
French, Spanish, or Portuguese in combination with one, two or more indigenous
languages (for example, former British and French colonies of Africa and Asia).
In such states, foreign languages (hereafter ex-colonial languages) dominate or
even play the role of eliminating the indigenous languages. In the case of all-exoglossic situation or colonial
model environment, none of the indigenous languages serves the purpose of
nation-building (the purpose of national government). All-exoglossic in a broader African historical context refers to colonial and
post colonial language situation.
Apart from endoglossic and exoglossic states, there are also other types that are more or less
similar to all-exoglossic nation-states
(colonial type). According to Heinz Kloss, if the numerical strength or the
total number of the native speakers of the ruling ethnic group is less than
70-80 percent-that is, if this ethnic group does not form the majority of the
population in the country, such a state may be defined as segmental-based nation/nationality state or multinational state and submersion-based
nation/nationality state or multinational state. The former refers to a
dominant minority group within a larger group of people, whereas the latter
shows the oppressive character of a state.
…the 5 percent American Liberians… but consider either
itself… or its language, or both, as symbols and safeguards of the nations at a
large identity…. Nation-states belonging to this second category may be called section-based because members of the
ethnic group claiming a privileged status for themselves or their languages are
not sufficiently numerous to automatically represent the nation as a whole….In
a majority of cases, the ethnic group speaking the dominant language has
formerly subjugated the other ethnic groups, some examples are the Amhara
in Ethiopia, the Afro-Americans now ruling Liberia,
and the Spaniards whose tongue dominates public life in Bolivia. These groups have defeated and conquered those ethnic groups who to this very day have preserved
their own languages and who still form the majority of the population (Fishman,
1968; 72).
Both the Section-based nation-states/nationality-states and
Subjection-based nation-states/ nationality-states are characteristically
oppressive, and especially in the case of the former, the ruling groups have no
attachment and allegiance to the bulk of the population of the country. In most
cases, the national official language is automatically the language of the
dominant minority. The Americo-Liberians
who were ruling Liberia and the Amhara
(Semites from the North) in Ethiopia, were the two uniquely formed states
protected and empowered by the ex-colonial powers of Europe; and were
characteristically different from other African states. Thus, the modern
Ethiopian empire-state of Haile-Sellasie and Mengistu is characteristically exoglossic nationality-state in a sense
that both the constitution and language policy declare the dominance of a
single language (Amharic) in the country. In this kind of state formation where
the only recognized tool of national official purpose is an imposed language, the
equality of several languages is unthinkable because the conquerors believe
that running the government and business activities without the predominance of
Amharic is impossible. Moreover, putting several languages on a fully equal
level of freedom is assumed to be dangerous for they jeopardize the activities
of the state; and thus, the ruling politicians opt for the recognition of the
national status symbol of languages of polarization, without which the
oppressive institutions cannot function as powerful arm of the state.
The solution to the problems
set up by the language barriers to education is far from easy, for it involves
dealing with some of the most basic issues in school and the wider society it
serves. For by its nature, language is a core factor in any education, for
education depends on communication and verbal coding of human knowledge. Nor
can dealing with language issues alone solve social problems. But until the
existence of the language barriers to education have been recognized and their
working carefully recognized, there is no chance of successful steps to
overcome the barriers and provide equal educational opportunities for all
(Spolsky, 1986: 188).
Language issues are central to human progress. The existence
of language barriers to education does not only deter any sort of social
transformation, but also disfigures human relations as a whole. Scrupulous and
impartial language typology in a multiethnic society is of greater concern in
the modern world because every successful step forward depends to a large
extent on solving linguistic inequalities. In macro-level sociolinguistics,
linguists often stress language
situations (multilingualism,
diglossic, exoglossic, endoglossic, etc.)
and types of languages (creole,
indigenous, imported or foreign, official, regional, local, etc.) in order to
avoid language discrimination. Thus, typology of language as part of language
planning deals with ‘language functions’ and a ‘theory of language building,’
and this includes the descriptive framework for the study of fair language
distribution in plural situations, the explanation of change in language situations,
language categories and numerical strength of the speakers of a particular
language. A reasonable and feasible language policy grants the rights of
individual members and groups of a society to equality of educational
opportunity in their mother tongues.
In dealing
with language policy and planning, we have to take into account some crucial
points such as the demarcation between ethnic and speech communities (a group
of people sharing characteristic patterns of vocabulary, grammar and pronunciation),
numerical strength of those speech communities, language variables (developmental status
of language, juridical or legal status and statistical order) and the type of a
state.
In his study
of Language-Nation Typology of the
developing nations, Kloss has divided languages into six different developmental statuses and six juridical statuses, depending on the socio-economic
transformational stage of each country. Though this approach may be less
important to the developed nations, which have already completed this phase or
stage of development, Kloss scientific study of language planning seems to be
still a model reference to many plural countries of the developing world,
especially Africa. The inflexible and unscientific planning paradigm we see in
Ethiopia and other developing nations of Africa can be criticized, corrected or
challenged only if we acquire a profound knowledge of language categories and
the status symbol assigned to each language by each state.
Heinz Kloss
suggests that (see Fishman 1968: 78-84), language planning should involve the
following developmental stages or categories:
A. A language of
modern science and technology, or in one sense, Language of Wider Communication
(LWC-English) and European languages are classified as Matured Standardized Languages (highly advanced languages).
B. When a language
is unable to develop because of the smallness of the speech community and
remained to be stagnant or excluded forever from the broader use of modern
concepts, such language is said to be Small
Group Standardized Language.
C.
The development of some languages may take place during
pre-industrial civilization in which ancient literature, religious searching
and philosophical writings might have been recorded and yet unsuitable for the
teaching of modern science and/or technology (example of such languages may be
‘old Latin’ and Ethiopian ‘Ge’ez’). This kind of language according to Kloss is
an ‘Archaic Language’ (a language no longer in use).
D.
If a language is recently standardized, and its modification
or elaboration process is still in the earliest stage, or if it is used in mass
education (literacy education) in a society, for
religious and political purposes, or if
it is used in teaching primary or secondary
education, such developmental stage is
referred to as ‘Young Standardized’ language.
E.
In some cases, a language may be reduced only to recent
writing, but its standardization has not
yet completed. This level of language
is classified as ‘Unstandardized
Alphabetized’ Language.
F. If a language is
spoken by the natives, but never or seldom used in writing, this language is
classified as ‘Pre-literate’ language
(verbal language).
With the exception of few languages, like Swahili, Somali,
Amharic, Sesotho, Malagasy, Zulu, Xhosa, Kinyarwanda and Kirundi, which are
closer to “A” level, almost all languages in Africa seem to have fallen under
the categories of B, C, D, E or F.
In a
democratic multiethnic country (example, South Africa), the status symbol
assigned to each language is quite encouraging. Conversely, in a totalitarian
plural state, like Ethiopia, favouring and empowering language of the ruling
minority is always the case.
Depending on
their level of development, Kloss also identifies the following six juridical
status of languages: (1) The sole national official language; (2). Co-equal
national official language or one among several official languages; (3)
Regional official language; (4) Promoted language-the language which is
accepted by authorities to be used in schools, libraries, may be printed as
newspapers, advertisement, governmental reports, laws, or used in translating
proclamations, etc., (5) Tolerated language-the language which is not promoted,
that is, if its elaboration, cultivation, or further literary development is
legally restricted except being used for religious purposes and in public
gatherings; (6) Proscribed language-the language whose native speakers are
legally deprived of the right to use it in their communal life is categorized
under this status. The status of Oromo language (Oromiffa) during the period of
Ethiopian constitutional monarchy and the communist Dergue can be categorized
under number 6 (see also the figures on languages). The current juridical or constitutional status of
Oromiffa is under category 3. In terms of developmental
stages, it may be classified under number D.
Amharic is the only national
official language in Ethiopia….Actually, however, the speakers of Amharic form
32 percent [this figure is exaggerated
and is greater than the numerical strength of the native speakers of the same
language by 4 percent after 19 years. See the statistics of Ethiopian
nationalities of 1986]. The speakers of Gallah [Oromiffa], for example, are
more numerous (44 percent) [this figure
is greater than the number of the native speakers of the same language
by 14 percent after 19 years. See the statistics of the above mentioned year],
than those of Amharic; yet their language falls under the proscribed languages
(Fishman, 1968: 82).
Let us now examine the
statistical method approach of modern language planning used by Kloss in order
to identify the status of different language groups. Before taking some
concrete examples, it is worth noticing the six standards of measurements for
rank order (categories of numerical strength) of the native speakers of
different languages.
I. Numerical Strength of the
Native Speakers
90-100%
(I)
70-89%
(II)
40-69%
(III)
20-39%
(IV
-19%
(V)
Below
3% (VI)
For the convenience of
thorough intelligibility of the combined symbols of tabulations, I have
employed different signs: Roman Numbers
(I, II, III, IV, V, VI), abbreviations
(MsL, SgsL, AsL, YsL, UsL, PlL), alphabets
(A, B, C, D, E, F) and Arabic Numbers
(1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) are used. The Roman Numbers stand for numerical category,
the alphabets represent the stages of language development and the Arabic
Numbers shows juridical or constitutional status.
II. Stages of Language
Development (see previous definitions)
A. MsL- Mature standardized
Language
B. SgsL- Small group
standardized Language
C. AsL- Archaic standardized
Language
D. YsL- Young standardized
Language
E. UaL- Unstandardized
alphabetized Language
F. PlL-Pre-literate Language
III. Constitutional or Juridical Status of Languages
1. SoL- The Sole official
Language
2. CeL- Co-equal Language
3. RoL- Regional official
Language
4. PL- Promoted Language
5. TL- Tolerated Language
6. PrL-Proscribed Language
In order to understand the idea of numerical strength of the
native speakers and combined symbol tabulations, I shall now try to illustrate
the points with examples. Amharic is the mother tongue of 30 percent of the
native speakers in Ethiopia. Oromiffa is the mother tongue of at least 55-60
percent of the native population in Ethiopia.
In the table below, the status of Oromo language during the period of 1968,
1986 was 30-44%. Somali is natively
spoken nearly by 90-100 percent of the population in Somalia. Thus, the
linguistic characterization of the above languages can be analysed in the form
of combined tabulation symbols (see next page).
Language planning is a government’s authorised, long-term,
sustained and conscious effort to alter a language’s function in a
society….Language policies, therefore, can promote, prescribe, discourage…the
use of language and thereby empower
or disempower speakers of languages
by giving higher or lower status to their languages. Language policies are
guided by particular ideologies or ultimate goals (Heine, 2000: 340-341).
Status Symbols of
Languages
Language
|
Country
|
Combined
Symbols
|
Stage of
Language
Development
|
Numerical
Strength/Total
Number of
Native Speaker
|
Juridical/
Constitutional
Status
|
Amharic
(During the periods of: 1910, 1952,
1968 & 1986)
|
Ethiopia
|
D1
(23%-55.5%-I)
|
Young Standard
Language (D)
|
23%-55.5%
|
The Sole
Official Language (1)
|
Oromiffa (During
the periods of:
1910, 1952, 1968
and 1986)
|
Ethiopia
|
F6
(10.4%-44%
-II)
|
Pre-literate Language (F)
|
18-%44%
|
Proscribed
Language (6)
|
Oromiffa (After
1992)
|
Ethiopia
|
D3
(55%-60%-I)
|
Young Standard
Language (D)
|
55%-60%
|
Regional Official
Language (3)
|
Somali
|
Somalia
|
D1
(90%-100%-I)
|
Young Standard Language (D)
|
90%-100%
|
The Sole
National Official
Language (1)
|
Table 1: Developmental Status, Juridical/Constitutional
Status, Numerical Strength/Total Number
of Native
Speakers and Language Group Categories
Source: Joshua A. Fishman. Language Problems of Developing
Nations, 1968;
Encyclopædia Britanica, Ready Reference and Index, 15th Edition, volume
3,
973-1974;
Institute of the Study of Ethiopian Nationalities, 1986.
Encyclopædia Britanica, Ready Reference and
Index, 15th Edition, volume 3,
973-1974;
Institute of the Study of Ethiopian Nationalities, 1986.
The State Classified
As we examine
this language characterization model, there are two types of countries; namely
the endoglossic nationality-state and
exoglossic nationality-state. For
example, in the case of Somalia, the only national official language of the
country is natively spoken by the majority population. At the same time, we see
that the Somalis are homogeneous. Thus, Somalia is endoglossic nationality-state. This means that it is also one of
the homogeneous nationality-state in
Africa. In the case of Ethiopia, however, the national official language of the
country (Amharic) is not natively spoken by majority of the indigenous
population, the Oromo; but has become the sole national official language. Oromiffa, language of the majority
population, is doomed to prohibition. After 1991, though the status of Oromiffa is relatively improved, it is
still unable to play the role of national official purposes because of the
undefined language policy in the country. As it has already been mentioned
earlier, Amharic language is actually the language of the ruling Amhara, who
ruled the country until 1991, and has been imposed on the majority population,
the Oromo, and other minority groups without considering any other option.
Therefore, feudal and communist Ethiopia is characteristically all-exoglossic nationality-state. It is
a country where totalitarian sovereignty and monolingual politics have reduced the Oromo and their
language not only to nominal existence, but also distorted the entire image of
the marginalized nation.
Genuine/Endoglossic
Nation-State/Nationality-State and
Section-based/Subjection-Based
Nation-State/Nationality-State
Combined Symbols
|
Country’s Classification (Characteristic
of a State)
|
1. A+I+1
(AI1)
|
Genuine nation-state/nationality-state and Endoglossic
nation-state/
nationality-state. A single-nationality-nation
characterized by majority
rule (language of the majority is national official).
|
2. A+II+1
(AII1)
|
Minority-based
(section-based) nation-state/nationality-state and Conflict-based (subjection-based) nation-state/nationality-state.
A multilingual state characterized by minority rule (language of the minority
is an official language).
|
3. A+III+1
(AIII1)
|
Minority-based
(section-based) nation-state/nationality-state and Conflict-based (subjection-based) nation-state/nationality-state.
A multilingual state characterized by minority rule (language of the minority
is an official language).
|
4. A+IV+1
(AIV1)
|
Minority-based
(section-based) nation-state/nationality-state and Conflict-based (subjection-based) nation-state/nationality-state.
A multilingual state characterized by minority rule (language of the minority
is an official language).
|
5. A+V+1
(AV1)
|
Minority-based
(section-based) nation-state/nationality-state and Conflict-based (subjection-based) nation-state/nationality-state.
A multilingual state characterized by minority rule (language of the minority
is an official language).
|
6. D+I+1
(DI1)
|
Minority-based
(section-based) nation-state/nationality-state and Conflict-based (subjection-based) nation-state/nationality-state.
A multilingual state marked by minority rule (language of the minority is an
official language).
|
7. D+II+1
(DII1)
|
Minority-based
(section-based) nation-state/nationality-state and Conflict-based (subjection-based)
nation-state/nationality-state. A multilingual state
characterized by minority
rule (language of the minority is an official language).
|
8. D+III+1
(DIII1)
|
Minority-based
(section-based) nation-state/nationality-state and Conflict-based (subjection-based) nation-state/nationality-state.
A multilingual state characterized by minority rule (language of the minority
is an official language).
|
9. D+IV+1
(DIV1)
|
Minority-based
(section-based) nation-state/nationality-state and Conflict-based (subjection-based) nation-state/nationality-state.
A multilingual state
dominated by the minority (language of the minority is an
official language).
|
10. D+V+1 (DV1)
|
Minority-based
(section-based) nation-state/nationality-state and Conflict-based
(subjection-based) nation-state/nationality-state. A multilingual state
marked by minority rule
(language of the minority is an official language).
|
Table 1: Combined Status Symbols of Languages and
Classification of States
Source: Joshua A. Fishman. Language Problems of Developing
Nations, 1968.
In developing
nations of conflict model where traditional methods of ruling are exercised, great tradition often connotes ‘T. S.
Eliot’s’ idea of the cultural and linguistic prestige of the dominant groups;
and in a technical term to address a superior status, high values and
importance of the tradition of empire-builders of the past. In terms of
language policy, the idea of greatness is an intention to facilitate favourable
condition for exercising dominance; and it is, therefore, necessary to avoid
such ambiguity. The idea of having great tradition or without great tradition
is basically contradictory to the modern concept of language planning and
linguistic freedom because no nation is created without its own treasured
values and qualities, though the hegemonic policy of Survival for the Fittest
(Darwinian Theory) has promoted some groups to the level of masters and
relegated the others to the level of subordination. In one sense, having or not
having a great tradition in the context of prey and predator relations is an
indication of appreciating inequality role relationships of people wherein
those who are empowered continue enjoying lion’s share.
In comparison
to other developing nations, Africa is very much lagging behind the modern
world mainly because of two reasons: first, lack of good governance and the
problem of pacing up with the civilized world. Second, African scholars are
unable to devise effective and democratic language policy. In general, the
failure to meet the challenges in the continent has damaged African noble
sentiment to bring about the development of African economy, languages and
cultures. Africans have still clung themselves to the old colonial mannerisms
and call for the adoption of the foreign languages and/or languages of the
dominant groups as the national official by internalizing lower status given to
them by the ex-colonial powers.
For a while they [African
nationalists] took pride in their command of the English language for reasons
that were, paradoxically, nationalistic. But would not this put them
English-speaking militants in the same category as Leopold Senghor with his affectionate attachment to the French
language? And yet we have to describe Senghor’s Pride in the French language as
at best a linguistic cosmopolitanism. What makes it possible for these early
English-speaking Africans to be “nationalists” in spite of revelling in English
language? (Fishman, 1968: 185).
This is a warning against imitative complex. Senghor believes
that French is the supreme language of communication, rather than his own
mother tongue. Some African intellectuals and scholars are still the prisoners
of such wrong impressions. Education and the quality of intellect to many educated Africans simply mean the
ability to speak and write English or French. Some Oromo scholars have also
similar problems. It seems, however, self-diminishing for those intellectuals
who assert their capacity by seeking solace and comfort in the non-native
languages and cultures. The notion of clinging to languages of the dominant
segments as the source of salvation, the most refined and valuable African
asset is contrary to modern civilization, democracy, the principle of
pluralistic moderation and nation-building. Africans cannot and will not grow
better as long as they keep on fighting for the perpetual domination of languages of mental control. Most of all,
whoever demonstrates a good command of foreign languages is always the best
person to be rewarded. The traditional belief about language politics and the
continuity of the admiration of the dominant tradition by the states have not
only hampered the development of indigenous African languages, but also
prevented the African masses from deciding their own destiny. Using the imposed
languages as permanent features in Africa has resulted in prolonging neo-colonialism and
dependency of all times.
From Japan: What is merely
modern-as science and methods of organization-can be transported, but what is
virtually human has fibres, so delicate and roots so numerous and far-reaching
that it dies when moved from its soil. Japan…cannot be turned into a mere borrowed machine. She has her own soil
which must assert itself over all…. Our Imperial Ancestors have founded our
empire on a basis of broad and everlasting, and have deeply and firmly implanted virtue. Our subjects, ever united in loyalty and filial piety,
have from generation to generation
illustrated the beauty thereof. This
is the glory of the fundamental character of our empire (Fishman, 1989:
138-139).Fishman (1985: 138) has also made similar remarks and said
that the Arabs want modernization, but they have no desire to lose their own
identity in the process.
In order to
function as a truly national symbol,
a language has to win a willing acceptance of different ethnic groups of a
country. “In India, English was supposed to be replaced by Hindi fifteen years
after independence. However, because of vehement opposition by non-Hindi
speaking groups, the requirement was suspended through the Language Legislation
Act of 1967” (Bamgbose, 1991: 22). In a democratic type of language planning,
the most important thing is to avoid the concept of imposing a language of a
certain group arbitrarily on other people as a symbol of unity. This means without a genuine study of the function
of languages, identity representation
in education and culture can never happen. Hence, it is of vital significance
to carry out a thorough scientific study of each language by means of using
language development indices and other semantic dimensions. The scientific
study of language must involve: orthography,
dictionary, grammar, the total population of the native and non-native speakers
of the language, literary and religious uses of the language and how far it is
used as medium of instruction in schools (elementary, secondary or higher educational levels) and its strength of being used in mass media
and publications (books, newspapers, letters, magazines, radio and television);
its capacity to translate technological ideas and scientific terms in research;
its level of standardization: mature standardized, adolescent, young
standardized, reduced to the level of writing (only alphabetized),
unalphabetized but spoken, etc (see W. Ferguson 1962, W. Stewart 1968,
Heinz Kloss and Joshua A. Fishman, 1968). Besides this, what makes a language
the ‘symbol of unity’ is whether or not that language is attached to the
history, socio-cultural life, national identity and other values of the people
concerned.
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