søndag den 4. august 2013


The Challenges and Perspectives of Globalization: Global Vision, Democracy and Local Resistance

Dr. Eshete Gemeda
University of Southern Denmark

The Theory of Compressing and Singularizing Natural Diversity

          Globalization, expansion and transnational alliance are not something we heard today. These terms, which are historically associated with power arrangement and a search for economic space, had emerged in the late 15th century. The expansion of European institutions across national boundaries goes back to the early voyages of the great navigators at the end of the 15th century through to the mass migration of Europeans across the Atlantic in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. In the 100 years following 1430, the world was explored by the leading European maritime nations, like French, British, Spanish and Portuguese. These countries expanded the search for more space in the world and developed outward surveys, while other powerful countries continued doing research inwardly to know more about overseas as a hostile threat. Both the domestic and overseas survey projects were attended by expansion, espionage and military experts of the period. Today’s arguments of many opposing forces of globalization are rooted in this history of European Empires and the disruptive consequences of the movements of empire builders. “This is clearly a major precursor of globalization as we know it today” (Dunkerley, 2000: 7).
          By the end of the 18th century, the powerful global forces of capitalists and imperial theoreticians emerged and this empowered European institutions to take root across the world throughout the 19th century and up to the mid-20th century. From these historic moments onwards, the influence of the West intensified under the impact of Christianity, civilizing missions and industrialization. The imitation of European high culture, traditions, norms and values was the order of the day. In general, the Westernization of the globe became the reality of colonial and postcolonial times. Massive European migration to the New World (the United States of America) and later to Australia and New Zealand had taken place. “Meanwhile, missionaries and European travellers began to extol the otherness of exotic cultures, especially in the period 1850-1880” (Beynon 2000). From the early voyage and colonial expansion to the present globalization, every attempt of reshaping or re-modernizing the world to meet the ideology of global melting pot, proved itself to be both constructive and destructive. The struggle for redefining and interpreting globalization is to avoid costly mistakes of postmodernism and postcolonial era. It is the struggle for global democracy in which every nation becomes the master of its home and its establishments.
          The fixed or natural boundaries and borders (e.g. Western Europe) and the unnatural boundaries (e.g. Africa) that have been created by blood and iron in the European nineteenth-century process of nation-building and ethnic separation, still contain the foundation of myths that one underpinned them. But everyday political narratives of the modernists tell us another story in which abstract constructs of post-globalism become real and concrete. As indicated earlier, the emergence of the idea of global modernity occurred in the early 16th century, and with the rise of modern capitalism, the term globalization has come to being and used as the expression of a ‘New Phase of Technological Revolution’ and the transition from one capitalist stage to the next complex stage of development marked by military presence. Many scholars, writers and activists believe that the age of globalization has not only brought about cultural and social compression, but also generated new challenges. It may be argued that modern civilization has different phases of development (from lowest to highest) and these phases of modernity or what I call the turning-points in modern history and monumental changes, are marked by the advancement of capitalism, the search for lucrative markets, political complex and socio-cultural transformation. “Globalization in our time is qualitatively different from previous manifestations in that modernization has accelerated globalization which has now permeated contemporary consciousness” (Robertson 1992). The term globalization, which represents historical shift and rearrangement of economic power, emerged to show the way global modernity in its highest stage transformed the world into deterritoriality and transnational alliance characterized by a highly centralized system, cultural compression and new militarism. Robertson traces the origin of globalization back to earlier times in which he identifies five historical phases of globalization in Europe (see Dunkerley 2000). The First Phase (1400-1750) shows the initial stage of global exploration, along with the spread of the Roman Catholic Church; the wide-spread adoption of Gregorian calendar, the advent of mapping modern geography, the growth of national communities and of the state system. The rise of Phoenicians (1500) as colonial powers is also included in this period. The First Phase before 1500 was known as Pre-modern Era in which a sense of globalization was inter-regional within Eurasia (Euro-Asian) and the Americas based on political and military empires. It was the time when massive movement of people into the uncultivated areas took place. 1500-1850 is known as The Early Modern Globalization. The stage of development was marked by the rise of the West and the Movement of Europeans into the Americas and the Oceania. “It was in this period that world religions spread and exerted their most significant cultural influence, especially Christianity and Judaism, both of which attained a global distribution” (Dunkerley, p. 10). The Second Phase (1750-1875) is the emergence of the internationalism in the form of global relations and exhibitions as non-European countries began to be admitted to the European dominated International Society. It was the period during which global colonial rivalry and expansion intensified. In general, the First and the Second Phases cover the history of the Atlantic Slave Trade of 1440-1850. The Third Phase (1875-1925) was the take-off stage of universalism characterized by globalizing tendencies such as expanding communication strategies and increasing economic and political relations, as well as cultural and sport links (e.g. Olympic movement). The First World War (1914-1918) is included in this process of globalism. The phase of Modern Globalization ranges from 1850-1925. This is an era of the acceleration of global networks and communication, cultural flows dominated by the European powers, notably the British; and the great migration of the Europeans to the New World (now The United States and Australia). The Fourth phase (1939-1969) was the period during which fierce economic rivalry between the rising capitalists and the struggle for dominance increased in a new form. The First World War and the Inter-War Period (1914-1939) were characterized by new colonial strategies, the re-division of the colonies and the creation of artificial or unnatural Boundaries (e.g. Africa). The Second World War (1939-1945), independence from colonialism (1945-1960) and the founding of ‘The United Nations’ occurred during this stage of global modernity. The Fifth Phase (1969-1989) was the era of Cold War during which the political tension between the two super powers-The United States and the former Soviet Union, threatened the world. This historical moment is characterized by the moon-landing and planetary exploration, the emergence of global institutions, global mass media and the world-wide debates concerning race, ethnicity, gender, sex, and the protection of human rights.
          In the preceding section, I have attempted to explain in brevity, the colonial impact of globalization. In terms of global imperial expansion, globalization is associated with the emerging of economic imperialism and new militarism. Imperialism refers to a policy of one country or many countries or peoples, usually developed, to extend its political and economic control over other territories or peoples of the developing nations. Imperialistic movements are of different kinds: political, financial or economic, military, linguistic and cultural. Imperialistic views and policies often emerge under different pretexts and restrict individual and national freedom by expanding ruthless exploitation of natural resources. Economic imperialism is characterized by the prevailing of deep crisis, mal-distribution of resources and income, together with monopolistic behaviour to grow powerful at the misfortune of others. In other words, the open up new markets and new investment opportunities in the developing world actually means domination and the impoverishment of the native populations. In the event of colonial globalization of 1440-1944, the map of the colonized world, especially Africa, undergone complete change, with most of the boundary lines have been drawn in a sort of game of give-and-take played in the foreign offices of the transnational alliances of the leading European colonial powers, like Great Britain, France, Spain and Portugal. By 1900, Africa was almost entirely divided into separate territories controlled by the powerful European colonial powers. The only exceptions were Liberia, generally regarded as under the special protection of the United States, and Ethiopia which was under the protection of Great Britain. Between May 1884 and February 1885, Germany made its first major bid for membership in the Club of Colonial Powers and announced its claims to territory in South-west Africa- Togoland and Cameroon and part of the East African Coast opposite Zanzibar. Two smaller regions- Belgium and Italy also entered the ranks. Portugal and Spain once again became active in bidding for African territories. In general, in the process of colonial modernity and globalization, the increasing number of participants in itself sped up the race for conquest and destabilization. With the rapid growth of imperial economic and political rivalry followed militarism and wilderness. The struggle of European colonial powers to control the Mediterranean Sea and the rise of Ottoman Empire complicated colonial globalism. This together with the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 increased the importance of the domination of the Mediterranean and North Africa- Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Egypt and Libya. The division of modern Africa, ethnic polarities and conflicts are the result of colonial modernity and arbitrary rule of imperialism. Whenever we discuss globalization, the timing, the space and conditions of the scramble for the developing world are historically noteworthy. The past historical development of colonial globalization enables us to be alert of the historical mission of the current movement for global convergence and power arrangements. 
          I suggest the Sixth Phase is also necessary because this phase, which may be referred to as today’s globalization, has its own peculiar characteristics and dramatic developments. Thus, the Sixth Phase (1989 to the present) is an age of the highest form of modernity in which complex information technology and business advancement compressed the world as one place. The end of Cold War and the disintegration of the Berlin Wall took place in this new stage of globalism. As already discussed, in the event of this highest form of civilization of the 21st century, we entered another era of uncertainty, economic competitions, natural and man-made disasters, environmental hazards, climate changes, new deadly diseases, like AIDS, Wars, the rapid increase of organized crimes, the revival of ancient ethnic hatred, sectarian violence, the re-emergence of old racism in new forms and the rise of global extremism. Ethnicity, the immense influence of global media and the increasing demand for multicultural democracy are also observable in today’s globalization. I have repeatedly emphasized that the contradictory nature of contemporary globalization makes its future more complex and uncertain.
But what makes contemporary globalization unique is that the world has moved from being in itself towards being for itself, in that, increasingly, nations now engage more in a wide range of economic, military and cultural contacts and people everywhere have increasingly come to comprehend the world as one place and to think, feel and act globally” (Beynon and Dunkerley, 2000: 9).
          In order for the world community to think, feel and act globally, globalization need to address powerfully the problematic issues confronting pluralistic democracy: the failed governance, the building of military machine, one-sided view of the world (extreme worldviews), global inequalities, the ideology of making violence and the criminalization of societies. Global inequalities and seeking militaristic solution to human conflicts reinforce cultural dichotomies, religious frictions and social fragmentations. As indicated by Schulz (p. 52), the dominant paradigm in communication research and theory has been a theoretical enclave within this larger theoretical-ideological formation, a part of its imperializing thrust. It has lived off the theoretical and institutional global power and dominance of that particular mode of thought. The dominant mode of thought has expanded and persisted in different form across the globe, inscribing other intellectual
institutions, other intellectuals and their traditions. It has inscribed everyone else into a subordinate placewithin its theoretical and ideological universe. Historically, globalization as a contradictory transformational theory has embraced and continued to foster the use of force, global system of exploitation, the metaphor of subordination and imperialistic intellectualism within its theme of deterritoriality and universalism. In general, the failure to rethink the problematic issue of compressing the globe has fuelled global tensions and re-energized nationalisms of different kinds.
          Schulz’s research of 2010 shows that after the great global expansion of communication studies under American sponsorship in the 1950s, it was almost the order of the day to say, “I am a communicator scholar,” and everyone knew exactly where you were, and what direction you were thinking in. Schulz sees that type of fancy expression as a form of intellectual imperialism. Progressively, however, as that ideological formation has come into contestation with other social forces in the world, as that conception of intellectual work has increasingly been challenged by alternative models and theories, its crisis has been precipitated and crisis of communication studies coincided with it. It is the crisis of that general theory, indeed, of that social formation, which is the real problem for global interconnection and communication studies of today.

The Metaphor of Interdependence: The Consequence of Universalizing and Centralizing the Culture of Regional Powers 

          Different scholars define globalization in different ways depending on their worldviews, that is, on the basis of their theoretical and ideological backgrounds. According to Tomlinson (1999), globalization refers to the rapidly developing and ever-increasing network of interconnections and interdependences that characterize modern social life. Tomlinson sees globalization as an empirical condition- the complex connectivity everywhere in the world today. McGrew (1992) speaks of globalization as the intensification of global interconnectedness and emphasizes the multiplicity of linkages it implies; namely goods, capital, people, knowledge, image, crime, pollutants, drugs, fashions and beliefs all readily to flow across territorial boundaries. In this definition, we see that transnational networks, social movements, political and economic relationships are extensive in all working places. The notion of complex connectedness and interdependence, which sometimes, marked by contradictions, is found in one form or another, in most contemporary narratives of globalization. The key point here is that the connections and relations suggested exist in very many manifestations ranging from the socio-cultural and institutional relationships that are rapidly increasing between individuals and groups worldwide, to the idea of the flow of knowledge, commodities and information technology across national borders. In a contemporary dynamics, globalization may be understood as the age of Information Revolution, technological advancement and business transformation marked by deterritoriality, expansion, military presence, convergence, interconnectedness, interdependence, the flow of knowledge, global integration and complex political scenarios. In this sense, globalization must be viewed in the historical context of current realities and developments in communication, media, culture and education.
          The open-ended term interdependence does mean many things. It could be forging genuine global intimacy or friendship in which equal economic power and mutuality of feelings occur. Contrastingly, it can be seen as a call for superficial oneness wherein the interconnectivity results in espionage, military control, exploitation, regional destabilization and polarization. For instance, the economic interdependence between the developed nations and most of the developing ones is always based on the dominant-dominated role relationships. The former controls both economic and political power, whereas the latter is totally or partially disempowered. In this type of interconnectivity, power distance damages the relations. In a situation where global inequality exists, interdependence and connectivity always operate on the basis of power polarities. “Modernity, one should not forget, produces difference [good or bad] exclusion, and marginalization. Holding out the possibility of emancipation, modern institutions at the same time create mechanisms of suppression rather than actualization” (Giddens, 2003: 6).  From the early development of the modern era to the present, modern institutions continued to be dynamic because they embraced and fostered the idea of human freedom, though trickery and traditional dogma have been far from over. According to Giddens, emancipation, which is the sign of progressive enlightenment, reveals itself in various guises. I think this holds true because in a world which is polarized by unmatched economic and political powers, oppression of one group by the other is inevitable. In such a situation, the significance of resistance politics does not decline. In brevity, it is unpractical to form perfect global unity within the growing power polarities. The underlying point is that interconnectivity theory, which is the core of globalization metaphor, does not necessarily indicate intimacy, sincerity and forging equality of power.
          From the traditional past to the highest form of modernity, politics of human freedom works within a hierarchical notion of power, that is, power is often understood as the capability of an individual or group to exert its will directly or indirectly over others. At every level of human development, several key concepts and orienting aims tend to be especially characteristic of this vision of politics. Any liberal political system is more or less concerned with either reducing or abolishing exploitation, inequalities and marginalization. Globalization in terms of the liberation of societies needs to give primacy to the imperativity of social justice, peace, equitability and popular participation in decision-making. By participation I am referring to the involvement of a truly represented body of people who have the ability to make things right. In a truly democratic process, every citizen must play an active role in making his/her voice to be heard. If however, globalization, instead of focusing on the decisive power of the grass-roots and genuine representation, opts for promoting the political will of handful politicians or representatives whose democracy is limited to procedural election, then it is almost unlikely to speak of global power equality.
          The concept of globalization must transcend global capitalist market or the shared global environmental threat, like politics of global warming and climate change. As Tomlinson (1999) has stated, intimacy or proximity takes us beyond the empirical condition of connectivity. From the suspended animation of flight, then, we have to confront the cultural adjustment of arrival. Our experienced journey through time than space has not prepared us for the new reality of this place. We have not experienced the sense of traversing of the real distance: the gradual changes of scene, the gradations in climate, the series of social interactions…the interruptions and pauses, the symbolical movements of border crossings and the sheer physicality which travel in the real time….This compression of distance has left us temporarily dislocated and we need to adjust to a reality which is immediate and challenging in its otherness, precisely because it is so accessible. One measure of the accomplishment of globalization, then, is how far the overcoming of physical distance is matched by that of cultural distance (Tomlinson, 1999: 5-6)
          Tomlinson compares a journey by plane and the problems connected to that journey with globalization and the difficulties confronting global politics in the process of business journey across boundaries. The example is so striking in that it illustrates the irony of the journey in which people focus on “time” than the reality on the ground. The flight is symbolically set to elaborate uncertainties, cultural and physical distance, compression and dislocation, in short, great challenges surrounding the journey to the unknown territories and cultures. These are again associated with global movements and the relative simplicity of border crossing with its own risk and burden. Giddens’s (2003) controversial view about globalism is not far from this. Modernity reduces the overall riskiness of certain areas and modes of life, and yet at the same time introduces new risk parameters largely or completely unknown to previous eras. These parameters include high-consequence risks: risks deriving from the globalized character of the social, economic, cultural and political systems of modernity (p. 4). As we move from one development to the next, we inevitably experience new risks that can affect us adversely if we fail to find out the way. Tomlinson has stressed that globalization needs to address the issue of cultural distance and the importance of adjusting to that distance than trying to compress it. The journey to host environments or localities is a journey to the challenging realities of cultural and political differences, posing the question of how far interconnectivity establishes intimacy beyond the technological modality of increasing access to the lucrative world market. The way globalization introduces a new way of thinking is appreciable in many aspects, but this modern oriented movement needs to transcend the level of information accomplishment. In this view, interconnectivity implies transforming localities or regions in the interest of the native population, not just picking selected individuals that can serve as mouthpieces. “Tracing the phenomenology of this modality of connectivity pushes us towards a high-profile understanding of globalization which is seductive but restricted in its application” (Giddens p. 8).
          Some critics, like Ohmae argue that economic globalization is a myth. The way he understands globalization with reference to cultural issues is deeply marked by one dimensional approach. As I have repeatedly underlined, globalization should not be viewed in black-and-white. If we do so, we lose our concrete perception of realities. As any development in human history, globalization has negative and positive aspects and these dimensions must be broadly analysed and presented to the public for judgement. Scholars, writers, journalists and commentators as living witnesses of the changing scenes need to document appropriately what is historically acceptable and accurate and what is inaccurate, unacceptable or invalid. If this living truth is undermined for whatever reason, the future looks bleak for the Road-Map to globalization. Both the broad utopian vision and the extreme views about globalization hardly appeal to rational thinkers. The reductionist approach to realities and the hyperbolic portrayal of what is untrue have always their own pitfalls.
For if globalization is understood in terms of economy, politics, culture, technology and so forth, we can see that it involves all sorts of contradictions, resistances and countervailing forces. Indeed, the understanding of globalization as involving dialectic of opposed principles and tendencies- the local and global, universalism and particularity-is now common, particularly in accounts which foreground cultural issues (Axford and Featherstone, 1995)
          It is evident that economic globalization has promoted a cross-border civilization and information technology, but this positive development is contradicted by powerful military presence everywhere and the ideology of global melting pot, which declares universalism and uniformity. In cultural terms, we see that a call for convergence outweighs divergence. In fact, this tendency of creating cultural singularity is unwelcomed by those who adhere to pluralistic democracy. Recognizing the significance of intercultural management matters for global movement because it is the core of interconnectivity, social solidarity and marks out a symbolic terrain of collective meaning construction. In economic terms, globalization may be seen as a strategic shift of restructuring postmodern capitalism and global advancement of capitalist hegemonic power characterized by centralizing theory. This characteristic of globalization has not only raised ideological objections, but also posed threats to local economies, cultures, religions, values, identities and political traditions. In my meaning, a local sense of culture or localizing the meaning of culture should not be challenged or suppressed by global sense of cultural construction. Global thinking and building modern institutions are necessary for coping with the constantly changing situations and outlooks, but we must at the same time remain cautious not to dislocate or replace the established social structures and values which characterize national existence. When we talk of modernity, it is also essential to explore the complexity surrounding it.
There is now a world culture, but we had better make sure we understand what this means….No total homogenization of systems of meaning and expression have occurred, nor does it appear likely that there will be one for sometime soon. But the world has become one network of social relationships, and between its different regions, there is a flow of meaning, as well as a flow of people and goods (Hannerz, 1990: 237).
From Hannerz’s argument, we understand that globalization has created complex networking and connectivity (positive development), but a vision of forming global culture as a single homogenized system of meaning is far from being realistic. The notion of cultural universalism or globalizing culture implies that a single hegemonic culture replaces and dominates the established cultural systems and values. I think the idea of homogenizing heterogeneity is not merely to impoverish or corrupt national and local cultures, but to root them out as well. As Friedman (1994: 195) has argued, the discourse of cultural imperialism from around the late 1960s tended to set the scene for the initial critical reception of globalization in the cultural sphere, casting the process as an aspect of the hierarchical nature of imperialism, that is, the increasing hegemony of particular central cultures. If globalizing culture is to squeeze natural diversity into impoverished and bankrupt homogeneity, then, global culture is more of a nightmare than a promise.
For in discussing the emergence of global culture in this more robust sense, we enter an essentially speculative discourse. The questions we are dealing with are ones of possibility, likelihood and the reading of trends and indications. But they are also questions that have been driven by on the other hand, hopes and aspirations for a better world in which all human experience may be united, improved and pacified; or on the other, fears of dystopia in which global cultural diversity will be squeezed into one dominant, impoverished and homogenized version. The discourse of an emergent global culture has thus, historically, been largely one articulated around threat and promise, dream and nightmare (Tomlinson, 1999: 72).
Any form of modernity is threatening if it tends to emasculate, and destabilize local people along ethnic, racial and political lines; undermines their culture, replaces or corrupt their traditions, values and identities. Contrastingly, modern civilization becomes successful if the new move or development reshapes, modifies, cultivates or even alters the previously built structures, without shaking the foundation upon which the national existence is based.
          A classical nation-state centric approach to the pluralistic world does damage democratic principles and encourage cultural imperialism, superficial unity and dystopian vision of homogenization in which national and regional identities vanish. “We do not live in a global village where a mythic, all-encompassing, technology-based super society replaces an outmoded and unwanted local social systems and cultures. Despite technology’s awesome reach, we have not and will not, become one people” (Dunkerley, 2000: 41) Dunkerley believes that potent homogenizing forces, including military weaponary, advertising techniques, dominant languages, media formats and fashion trends undeniably affect consciousness and culture in virtually every corner of the world. Such spheres of influence introduce and reinforce certain standardizing values and practices. But they do not enter cultural uniformity contexts. They always interact with diverse local conditions. On a global scale, homogenizing global forces encounter a wide range of traditions and ideologies produced by heterogeneity. 
          As John Beynon (p. 2) has highlighted, riding on the back of ever-more effective communication technologies with global reach, contemporary globalization has undoubtedly changed the relationship between time and space. In the process, it rendered the world a more compressed place. As to the consequence of globalization, people’s opinions are sharply divided on the basis of their ideological backgrounds, especially in respect of cultural deterritoriality and economic convergence. This division can be seen in three ways: first, globalization is understood by some as a perfect progressive and liberating phenomenon which opened up the potential for greater human connectedness and the world-wide spread of democracy, human rights and intercultural understanding. The second view is that globalization is nothing more than subversive militaristic movement against national and local self-definition. According to this view, globalization as a strategic tool for global exploitation is characteristically a destabilizing force. Beynon and Dunkerley (p. 11) have made similar statements in their definition of globalism and globalization. Globalism is the view that the world market is now powerful enough to supplant local and national political actions. Globalization is the blanket theory to describe the process through which sovereign national states are criss-crossed and undermined by transnational actors with varying prospects of power, orientations, identities and networks. The third group believes that globalization has its own merit and demerit. In this case, it has both negative and positive aspects. I think this is the right way of looking at the politics of globalization. It is impossible to capture the true picture of globalization in extreme terms. If we tend to reward extreme views, we situate ourselves in a difficult condition and consequently lose a concrete perception of historical realities. When we say human condition is global-oriented perspective, we are referring to a growing awareness, openness and social solidarity conceived in people’s minds throughout the world. This, however, does not mean humanity in its unified whole or reducing diversity to a single totality.
          Modernism and postmodern events have had their own great hopes, promises, a wave of fear and predicaments, and so has globalization, which is a combination of rewards and risking experiences. As portrayed in the preceding sections, it is a rewarding experience because it has uplifted the spirit of millions of people around the world, who lost their birthrights, dignity and voices. The unrewarding experience of globalization is that it insists on and overemphasizes one way of thinking about global culture and unbalanced interdependence. It is within this complex often contradictory hegemonic-centric cultural and political projection that the vision of global convergence must be analysed. Many opposing forces argue that global uniformity is an abstract theory which is antithetical to global diversity. Some of the objections and suspicions raised by several scholars and political activists are due to the fact that globalization focuses on occidental bias, that is, its tendency to stress a particular experience of democratic West by undermining, ignoring, obscuring or superficially recognizing the rich diversity. The exploration of speculative discourses of complex globalism and interconnectivity is thus to facilitate the path for genuine global democracy and voluntary co-operation. I used the term voluntary co-operation just to make a distinction between utopian visions of globalism of the late 19th century (colonial era) and its corrupting influence, and globalization of the free market world of the 21st century.
          In hegemonic terms, one consumer culture (global culture) actually means to encourage the entire lifestyle of people- that is, the style of eating habits, dressing, architectural and music form, the pattern of cultural experience, presented by the media, a set of philosophical ideas, values, attitudes, political processes, religious views, scientific and technological rationality to be dominated by the transnational actors. The ideology of arbitrary universalism could be understood as the global spread of social, cultural and economic totality. Historically, globalization as part of Western civilization is a way of expressing powerfully the economic, cultural, political and military presence of the West everywhere (see different phases of globalism). This presence, which is the powerful image of power and dominance, has been opened to wide-spread criticism and sometimes violent confrontation (e.g. global activist movements and resistance). Global modernity and the developmental theory of a new world order in relation to seeking more space for economic and political empowerment, imply the way people lose their specific direction in any cultural and geographic location and have become the reproducers of cultural practices that are contradictory to local traditions, values, customs and norms. This type of cultural deterritoriality principle is not embraced by many modern thinkers because it is disruptive than being constructive. Economic globalization can generate deep anxiety and fear if a call for democracy is mixed with espionage, patronizing attitudes, forcing circumstances and the image of war.
          In his book “The Westernization of the World” (1996), the French political economist, Serge Latouche, presented a particularly indictment of global modernity as the drive towards planetary uniformity and a world-wide standardization of lifestyle. The contemporary global cultural critique is typical of this. In relation to the theory of globalization, Latouche has identified two central tenets of the Western world: (1) deterritoriality modality or global cultural control, and (2) territoriality modality or local cultural control. He portrayed the former negatively and the latter positively. According to his finding, the West is stratified into two groups with regard to looking at cultural principles; namely the West in Itself and the West for Itself (see John Tomlinson 1999). The former refers to the West as an abstract cultural principle, while the latter is to mean the West as a specific geo-cultural entity. This means, the West for Itself is basically characterized by a set of particular cultural practices identifiable with a territorial base in which local cultural control is stronger (e.g. Denmark, Switzerland, Spain, Canada, Norway, Sweden, etc), whereas the West in Itself characterized by deterritoriality base (e.g. the United States). The deterritorialized cultural modality or global-centred cultural principle tends to focus on universalism, that is, without much sense of local cultural control. On the other hand, territorialized cultural modality adheres to the significance of geo-cultural entity (local-centred cultural principle). Cultural nationalism and identity feelings are stronger in the latter than the former. In the deterritorialized base principle, what matters most is patriotism than local-based cultural self-definition. In the event of the contraction of European Empire and the decolonization process of 1945-1960, cultural territorial retreat occurred, though the European cultural hegemony persisted.
          Expansion, de-territoriality and political complexity are the centre of controversy in globalization. I say controversy because globalization, like modernism and postmodernism, is unable to abolish or surmount the crimes of wars and the politics of playing race cards. This leads us to the conclusion that connectivity and interdependence in terms of unmatched relations are conditions which need redefinition, elaboration and interpretation. The debates surrounding cultural globalization and transnational alliance focus on the perceived threat of cultural domination posed by the economically powerful Western countries through political influence and the transmission of cultural goods within the global and capitalist market. “In this perspective, what is generally termed global culture is held to be an ideological tool in the service of the revitalized, accelerated phase of global capitalism” (Beynon and Dunkerley, 2000: 28). The control of world economy and technology is the bedrock upon which cultural and political hegemony is built and sustained.
          As argued by Robertson (1992), if globalization is to mean the process whereby the world increasingly becomes one place and the ways in which we are made conscious of this process, then, the cultural and social changes thematically set in postmodernism seem to point in the reverse direction by directing us to consider local or regional. This may be taken as misunderstanding or misinterpreting the nature of the process of globalization. Current globalization is understood by many to imply that there is, or will be a unified world society and culture. In a global village world order, such an outcome could be thought of as the ambition of certain dominant states at a turning-point in the history, and the possibility of renewing or reshaping the world institutions and states in their own images. Dunkerley and Beynon (p. 122) have realized that the growing intensity of connectivity and communication between nation-states and heterogeneous states may produce conflicting cultures if that interconnectedness fails to draw a clear boundary between self and others. From this perspective, the changing circumstances, that are the result of the current phase of intensified globalization, can be understood as provoking reactions that seek to rediscover particularity, localism and difference, which generate a sense of the limits of the culturally unifying projects associated with Western modernity. In one sense, it can be argued that globalization in some cases produces the theory of postmodernism. The manipulability of mass audiences by the theory of monolithic system and global assimilation strategies may also result in the negative cultural effects of postcolonial and postmodern times.
The first phase of globalization was plainly governed, primarily, by the expansion of the West, and institutions which originated in the West. No other civilization made anything like as pervasive an impact on the world, or shaped it so much in its own image….Although still dominated by Western power, globalization today can no longer be spoken of only as one-way of imperialism… increasingly there is no obvious direction to globalization at all, and its ramifications, then, should not be confused with the preceding one, whose structures it acts increasingly subvert (Giddens, 1994b: 96).
Giddens argument shows that global modernity goes back to colonial and postcolonial period, during which the colonial powers directly controlled the territories and economies of the colonized world under the guise of civilizing missions. This period was marked by intolerance, slavery and slave trade, cultural denial and the expansion of colonial institutions that warped the mental universe of the colonized nations. According to Giddens, today’s globalization differs from global colonial modernity in that the West in some ways lost socio-cultural grip (p. 52). His satirical explanation reveals that the declining grip of the West over the developing world makes today’s globalization less blatant and less subversive. 
          “Now we could read Giddens here as simply proposing an ironical winner-loses situation: the very success of the West resulting in the loss of its socio-cultural advantage” (Tomlinson, p. 92). This claim may be viewed in two ways: first, that the rapid advancement of the developing world (e.g. China, South Korea, Japan, India, Singapore, Brazil and South Africa) has challenged the conventional method of economic globalization and the metaphor of uniformity. Second, that militarism, political dominance and controlling tendencies are antithetical to the democratic model of global socio-cultural integration. Altogether global modernity in a democratic context is associated with the integration of the globalized cultural experiences and bringing global brainpower together and work for collective growth and prosperity. It is not a win-win strategy which in fact is running risks. “Globalization is uneven process, not just in that it involves winners and losers or that it reproduces many familiar configurations of domination and subordination, but also in the sense that the cultural experience it distributes is highly complex and varied” (Giddens, p. 131).
          The deep economic recession in the Pacific region in the 1990s and later in the Western world in 2008, seems to have created one of the major anxieties of the millennium in which an attempt to return to the status-quo of assuring Western economic upper hand has adversely affected the fundamental democratic values of the West. The worst case scenario and the image of horror in Iraq may be taken as a case in point. I think globalization has to redefine the economic, cultural and political relations between the developed and the developing world. In order for globalism roadmap to make sense, it is imperative to make a broad research that can help harmonize the notion of global convergence with local values and political culture.


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søndag den 28. juli 2013

Hegemonic Pluralism and Imperialistic Use of Language in Postcolonial and Post-Empire Africa

Conflict-Model Political Arrangement in Postcolonial and Post-Empire Africa: The Nature of State Formation and Marginalized Identity in Language and Culture


Dr. Eshete Gemeda
University of Southern Denmark


                      The State Defined

          Modern institutions are characteristically different from traditional forms of social order in respect of their dynamism and quality, the degree to which they function and their global impact. Modernity radically alters traditional way of thinking and increases interconnections between peoples of the globe. These connections may reinforce both our collective and personal interests or complicate the beauty people share in common. “Even if distance and powerlessness do not inevitably go together, the emergence of globalized connections, together with high consequence risks, represent parameters of social life over which the situated individual has relatively little control” (Giddens, 2009: 192). As Giddens has argued, globalization concerns the intersection of presence and absence, the interlacing of social events and social relations at distance with local context. The physical presence is contrasted by absence and correspondingly, local context is contrasted by social relations at distance. These contradictory intersections characterize globalization theory and the high-consequence risks. Global modernity or the post-traditional order is sometimes viewed as a risk transition in a sense that what is expected to be positive outcome and constructive often turns out to be negative and disastrous.
          What makes human beings different from other animals is their socialization character and the conscious social activities take place in an organized, systematic and planned manner. This leads us to the point concerning the way people bring their brainpower together to have control over their lives and their territories. The organized way of operating in a defined territory may be encapsulated as ‘the state.’ In the functional terms, the state is defined by different scholars on the basis of their ideological backgrounds, although the general dictionary definition may remain universal. Different interpretations of the state, therefore, provide us broad accounts of its formation, development and functions. In sociological terms, the state is understood both as the government and the complex organizations that enable the social fabrics to function effectively. In a standard sense, the state refers to an organized political community of a country controlled by one government. This organized social force is characterized by civil servants, tax collectors, police, national army and diplomats that are empowered by constitution. Government as the state machinery may be viewed as a particular system wherein an organized group of people control a country or a state. The state, therefore, constitutes functionally defined institutions and organizations that accomplish governmental tasks within their power. These tasks include: maintaining law and order, the management of external affairs or relations through diplomacy, policy-making and planning, the enforcement of law, taxation and political representations through parliamentary bodies and political parties (see Giddens 2009).
          The authority, power and control differ from country to country depending on the nature of the state. In the totalitarian states where power is tightly centralized, the authorities are unchecked. The monopoly of the use of force enables them not merely to mobilize and manipulate the people, but also control their mental universe. Here, the authoritative thinking generates unbridgeable power boundary (distance) between members of the pyramid and the grass-roots. Conversely, in an egalitarian state, devolution is highly exercised and the system of decentralizing power facilitates a strong sense of self-assurance. The liberal state thus focuses on building a self-contained society capable of controlling its own destiny. The two kinds of states are characteristically antagonistic; the former reactionary and stagnant, the latter revolutionary and dynamic.

Postcolonial Identity and Language Situation: Hegemonic State
and Power Deficit

          Modern monolingual theorists and the blanket theory they pursue picture/portray forced unity and unnatural singularism as perfect scientific paradigm, which bind diverse people together as a stable and unified political entity. Monolingual universalism approach in ethno-linguistic diversity is the falsification and misinterpretation of language issues. It merely focuses on the importance of superficial commonness and ignores narrower natural human attachment (attachment to one’s origin) without which broader human relations and a sense of universal brotherhood cannot be achieved. It seems problematic to try to talk about the distant world before teaching people how to know themselves better, understand their own root and  their own way which empower them to develop critical thinking and have a clear image of the world around them. In a developing world, like Africa, where monolingual theoreticians focus on the issue of bringing the distant world together by preventing or discouraging those who want to begin with building their own world and their own homes, a truly global solidarity of nations can never happen. Here lies the controversy of this theory. It has fallen through to explicate fully the theory of universalism and the concept of language efficiency in a contemporary pluralistic situation.
         Human beings express their many attachments in different ways, pursue a variety of goals to attain both wider (broader) and narrow linguistic rights and rewards at various times of their life spans; but these noble goals are frequently frustrated by monolingual politics, which views all positive options and desires as destructive. Within a broader context of structural inequalities of hegemonic states, monolingual universalism contributes to ethnocentrism and modern linguistic racism. Human accumulative experience, including repertoire variety, has been profoundly affected by this theory of restrictive parochialism, which stresses mechanical oneness of people and their languages in the name of universalism or global convergence.
          Language policy is the reflection of the state. In a conflict model multinational state, the ruling élite pursues the principle of partisan, and so does its language planning. Very often, languages and cultures of the ruling groups play the dominant role and enjoy higher status and power, in much the same way as members of the pyramid themselves, whereas other languages and cultures are partially or totally disempowered or paralysed by the ‘exclusionary theory of Otherness.’
Language planning is a government’s authorised, long-term, sustained and conscious effort to alter a language’s function in a society….Language policies, therefore, can promote, prescribe, discourage…the use of language and thereby empower or disempower speakers of languages by giving higher or lower status to their languages. Language policies are guided by particular ideologies or ultimate goals (Heine, 2000: 340-341).

Our ability to explore soberly the nature of states in a contemporary world enables us to devise a successful language policy and any kind of development at large. Time changes; and so does a society; and with the changing of a society, language politics also changes. The development or stagnant lifestyle of people is, therefore, the result of the direction of the changing political scenes and the nature of the states. The language planning a state pursues may help the nation move forward in peace and harmony or may bring about division, violence and disintegration. The longstanding language problems in Sub-Saharan Africa are the reflection of colonial legacy of state formation. The ideology of violence has its root in the characteristic of a plural society and the nature of the formation of the state. The complex patterns of pluralism are reduced to the simple inversion of dialectical opposition if language, culture and humanity are dichotomized between the free and the unfree. For instance, in the postcolonial environment, the state is not merely undemocratic, but also functions as a dividing wall in the antagonistic relations of the two opposing camps, the dominant and the dominated, and this frequently generates irreconcilable contradictions and violence. For instance, the decolonization periods in Africa (1945-1960) were attended by violence because the issue of decolonization essentially demands the complete change of role relationships.
I will accept…the assumption that men have to be forced from positions of dominance, that they will not relinquish or share power they have once enjoyed. Rationalizations that dehumanize the subject peoples and glorify the civilized mission of their overlords justify ready recourse to repression and force (Kuper, 1969: 159).
Kuper has emphasized that the use of force is encouraged by the greater development of political institutions and the generations of disproportionate positional power. The empirical evidence for the inevitability of violence is more convincing in all settler societies where the empowered linguistic minorities exercise domination over the majority population and other disempowered minority groups. The theoretical argument for the necessity of violence as an instrument of change rests on the nature of the state. “The moral justification for violence derives from oppression and humiliation, from the transparency of the connection between the good fortune of those who rule and the misery of those who are ruled, and from the concepts of human and the rights of man” (ibid., p. 154). National renaissance, national liberation, the restoration of nation-hood, whatever the headings may be the struggle against totalitarianism is always a violent phenomenon.
          The ideology of fixities in the continent does not allow any broad alternatives which reverse the unnatural way of putting peoples and their languages together. In order for the African states to function as truly independent states, it is necessary to change the anachronistic ruling strategy imposed on them by ex-colonial powers. This means the true freedom of Africans and their languages cannot happen as long as totalitarian sovereignty dictates the democratic way of looking at African politics of national unity. I think African scholars need to redefine modern African states and the unnatural unification programme created by them.
Most of the new states [refers to states of the developing nations] come into existence without that unity of sentiment, geography, administrative organization, language and cultural tradition that is taken for granted as the basis of nationhood in the more settled states. Japan and Korea, with their relatively homogeneous population sharing the same language, culture and tradition come closest to the Western conception of the nation-state. But even an enduring historic entity like China, was not so much a nation-state in the modern sense as a multi-national empire with a central core of Han people and a periphery of tributary states (Fishman, 1968: 453).
As we probe into the history of colonialism in Africa, modern African states are more or less the multi-national empire states which are the creation of ex-colonial powers. Their geographical limits have been determined by these powers. In some cases, due to injustice and irreconcilable contradictions between the dominant group and the people held together by force, the permanence of the boundary limits may not always be guaranteed (example, Eritrea and Ethiopia). Language as most valuable possession needs scientific planning, and this planning is the only alternative to solve the crisis of language politics in the modern world.
The absence of system analysis of language problem and language policy in individual languages, and the failure to identify explicitly constants across the boundaries of individual languages are closely connected with the absence of attempts to formulate a general theory in the study of this field. Difficulties begin with the concepts of problems, policy and language. The descriptive level is confused with the prescriptive one. There is no model on which a systematic description may be passed. And prescriptive far more frequently belongs to the sphere of actual politics than the sphere of political science (ibid; p. 285).
 In language planning and policy, studying language typology as well as identifying the principles, which govern this study are one of the primary tasks of the planners. Of these principles, development and democratization need to be emphasised. The effectiveness and failure of the language policy are appropriately evaluated by the characteristic features of planning and their contribution to the cultural, social and economic development of the people concerned. It is of great importance to asses how far the intended policy has favoured the creation of equal opportunity and smooth solidarity of the diversified groups.
         In plural countries, language planning may be fair if two or more languages are granted a status of official language; and this is at least an indication of the recognition of the importance of multi-lingual and multicultural principles. In African situation, however, language policies of most of the states do not recognize this approach. Even if two or more languages are recognized as national official, the non-native languages, especially the foreign languages, always play a more decisive role than the native ones, which have ethnically, culturally, traditionally or religiously important values to African masses. In such a planning strategy, the right of the individuals and groups to strengthen varieties of the indigenous languages that have significant symbolic values to them is limited. It is limited in such a way that rewarding the imported languages and devaluing or undermining the indigenous ones becomes apparent. Thus, the incentive to work hard to enrich the native languages is likely to be much less.
         In the study of the formation of a particular state, it is imperative to explore its distinctive characters. Sociolinguists recognize two types of states depending on the socio-economic and cultural development of different peoples of different countries: the nation-state or nationality-state (singularity-state or homogeneous) and multi-national state (plurality-state or heterogeneous). A country is called a nation-state or a nationality-state if the population of that country is homogeneous (a single ethnic group or homogeneous nationality-nation) having a single language and culture and has made its mother tongue the tool of government activities. As Fishman (1968: 69) has pointed out, “The singleness of the language indicates that we are dealing with a nation undivided [along different ethnic lines], that is, with a clearly dominant group which constitutes undisputed majority of the inhabitants.” The states of Western Europe are of this type. The stability, harmonious relations, peace, freedom, economic and technological advancement of this part of the world is mainly the result of natural homogeneity and democracy. In Africa, Somalia and Burundi are the only nationality-state where singularistic situation (common characteristic) occurs and where more than 90 percent of the populations are natives and the only national official language of the country is the language of this singular-ethnic majority. In homogeneous societies where national official languages are the mother tongues of the majority population (for example, Danish, German, Swedish, Norwegian, Japanese, Korea, Somali, Burundi, etc), the states are called nation-states. According to Heinz Kloss, these kinds of states are also called genuine nation-states and they are characteristically endoglossic states or homogeneous. An endoglossic country is a country where a native language of the majority (first language) is a national official of the state. On the contrary, exoglossic state or hegemonic state refers to a country where the dominant language of the minority (second language), especially the non-native one becomes an official language of the state. The two kinds of states are characteristically dissimilar and contradictory.
         A state is called a multi-national state if two or more languages are natively spoken by different ethnic groups in a country. It refers to a heterogeneous society where the freedom of languages is often threatened because of the oppressive nature of states and lack of scientific and genuine approach to national language planning. In such states, the emergence of authoritarian groups often creates power imbalance and linguistic injustice. The research of Heinz Kloss shows that nation-states are endoglossic states, whereas multi-national states are exoglossic states; and the two are functionally dissimilar. As already mentioned, the former refers to a country where the native official language is natively spoken by the majority of the population; and the latter shows a country in which the national official language is either imported or selected from among the minorities and imposed. The dominant group whose language is used as a tool of mental control by no means represents the majority population in the country. A country can either be Part-exoglossic state or all-exoglossic state (Kloss 1968 & 1969). In the former, we find the joint use of languages for national or official functions in the country-that is, the use of English, French, Spanish, or Portuguese in combination with one, two or more indigenous languages (for example, former British and French colonies of Africa and Asia). In such states, foreign languages (hereafter ex-colonial languages) dominate or even play the role of eliminating the indigenous languages. In the case of all-exoglossic situation or colonial model environment, none of the indigenous languages serves the purpose of nation-building (the purpose of national government). All-exoglossic in a  broader African historical context refers to colonial and post colonial language situation.
         Apart from endoglossic and exoglossic states, there are also other types that are more or less similar to all-exoglossic nation-states (colonial type). According to Heinz Kloss, if the numerical strength or the total number of the native speakers of the ruling ethnic group is less than 70-80 percent-that is, if this ethnic group does not form the majority of the population in the country, such a state may be defined as segmental-based nation/nationality state or multinational state and submersion-based nation/nationality state or multinational state. The former refers to a dominant minority group within a larger group of people, whereas the latter shows the oppressive character of a state.
…the 5 percent American Liberians… but consider either itself… or its language, or both, as symbols and safeguards of the nations at a large identity…. Nation-states belonging to this second category may be called section-based because members of the ethnic group claiming a privileged status for themselves or their languages are not sufficiently numerous to automatically represent the nation as a whole….In a majority of cases, the ethnic group speaking the dominant language has formerly subjugated the other ethnic groups, some examples are the Amhara in Ethiopia, the Afro-Americans now ruling Liberia, and the Spaniards whose tongue dominates public life in Bolivia. These groups have defeated and conquered those ethnic groups who to this very day have preserved their own languages and who still form the majority of the population (Fishman, 1968; 72).
Both the Section-based nation-states/nationality-states and Subjection-based nation-states/ nationality-states are characteristically oppressive, and especially in the case of the former, the ruling groups have no attachment and allegiance to the bulk of the population of the country. In most cases, the national official language is automatically the language of the dominant minority. The Americo-Liberians who were ruling Liberia and the Amhara (Semites from the North) in Ethiopia, were the two uniquely formed states protected and empowered by the ex-colonial powers of Europe; and were characteristically different from other African states. Thus, the modern Ethiopian empire-state of Haile-Sellasie and Mengistu is characteristically exoglossic nationality-state in a sense that both the constitution and language policy declare the dominance of a single language (Amharic) in the country. In this kind of state formation where the only recognized tool of national official purpose is an imposed language, the equality of several languages is unthinkable because the conquerors believe that running the government and business activities without the predominance of Amharic is impossible. Moreover, putting several languages on a fully equal level of freedom is assumed to be dangerous for they jeopardize the activities of the state; and thus, the ruling politicians opt for the recognition of the national status symbol of languages of polarization, without which the oppressive institutions cannot function as powerful arm of the state.
The solution to the problems set up by the language barriers to education is far from easy, for it involves dealing with some of the most basic issues in school and the wider society it serves. For by its nature, language is a core factor in any education, for education depends on communication and verbal coding of human knowledge. Nor can dealing with language issues alone solve social problems. But until the existence of the language barriers to education have been recognized and their working carefully recognized, there is no chance of successful steps to overcome the barriers and provide equal educational opportunities for all (Spolsky, 1986: 188).
Language issues are central to human progress. The existence of language barriers to education does not only deter any sort of social transformation, but also disfigures human relations as a whole. Scrupulous and impartial language typology in a multiethnic society is of greater concern in the modern world because every successful step forward depends to a large extent on solving linguistic inequalities. In macro-level sociolinguistics, linguists often stress language situations (multilingualism, diglossic, exoglossic, endoglossic, etc.) and types of languages (creole, indigenous, imported or foreign, official, regional, local, etc.) in order to avoid language discrimination. Thus, typology of language as part of language planning deals with ‘language functions’ and a ‘theory of language building,’ and this includes the descriptive framework for the study of fair language distribution in plural situations, the explanation of change in language situations, language categories and numerical strength of the speakers of a particular language. A reasonable and feasible language policy grants the rights of individual members and groups of a society to equality of educational opportunity in their mother tongues.
         In dealing with language policy and planning, we have to take into account some crucial points such as the demarcation between ethnic and speech communities (a group of people sharing characteristic patterns of vocabulary, grammar and pronunciation), numerical strength of those speech communities, language variables (developmental status of language, juridical or legal status and statistical order) and the type of a state.
         In his study of Language-Nation Typology of the developing nations, Kloss has divided languages into six different developmental statuses and six juridical statuses, depending on the socio-economic transformational stage of each country. Though this approach may be less important to the developed nations, which have already completed this phase or stage of development, Kloss scientific study of language planning seems to be still a model reference to many plural countries of the developing world, especially Africa. The inflexible and unscientific planning paradigm we see in Ethiopia and other developing nations of Africa can be criticized, corrected or challenged only if we acquire a profound knowledge of language categories and the status symbol assigned to each language by each state.
         Heinz Kloss suggests that (see Fishman 1968: 78-84), language planning should involve the following developmental stages or categories:
A.    A language of modern science and technology, or in one sense, Language of Wider Communication (LWC-English) and European languages are classified as Matured Standardized Languages (highly advanced languages).
B.     When a language is unable to develop because of the smallness of the speech community and remained to be stagnant or excluded forever from the broader use of modern concepts, such language is said to be Small Group Standardized Language.
C.     The development of some languages may take place during pre-industrial civilization in which ancient literature, religious searching and philosophical writings might have been recorded and yet unsuitable for the teaching of modern science and/or technology (example of such languages may be ‘old Latin’ and Ethiopian ‘Ge’ez’). This kind of language according to Kloss is an ‘Archaic Language (a language no longer in use).
D.    If a language is recently standardized, and its modification or elaboration process is still in the earliest stage, or if it is used in mass education (literacy education) in a society, for
      religious and political purposes, or if it is used in teaching primary or secondary
      education, such developmental stage is referred to as ‘Young Standardized language.
 E.     In some cases, a language may be reduced only to recent writing, but its standardization has not 
       yet completed. This level of language is classified as ‘Unstandardized AlphabetizedLanguage.
F.      If a language is spoken by the natives, but never or seldom used in writing, this language is classified as ‘Pre-literate’ language (verbal language).
With the exception of few languages, like Swahili, Somali, Amharic, Sesotho, Malagasy, Zulu, Xhosa, Kinyarwanda and Kirundi, which are closer to “A” level, almost all languages in Africa seem to have fallen under the categories of B, C, D, E or F.
         In a democratic multiethnic country (example, South Africa), the status symbol assigned to each language is quite encouraging. Conversely, in a totalitarian plural state, like Ethiopia, favouring and empowering language of the ruling minority is always the case.
         Depending on their level of development, Kloss also identifies the following six juridical status of languages: (1) The sole national official language; (2). Co-equal national official language or one among several official languages; (3) Regional official language; (4) Promoted language-the language which is accepted by authorities to be used in schools, libraries, may be printed as newspapers, advertisement, governmental reports, laws, or used in translating proclamations, etc., (5) Tolerated language-the language which is not promoted, that is, if its elaboration, cultivation, or further literary development is legally restricted except being used for religious purposes and in public gatherings; (6) Proscribed language-the language whose native speakers are legally deprived of the right to use it in their communal life is categorized under this status. The status of Oromo language (Oromiffa) during the period of Ethiopian constitutional monarchy and the communist Dergue can be categorized under number 6 (see also the figures on languages). The current juridical or constitutional status of Oromiffa is under category 3. In terms of developmental stages, it may be classified under number D.
Amharic is the only national official language in Ethiopia….Actually, however, the speakers of Amharic form 32 percent [this figure is exaggerated and is greater than the numerical strength of the native speakers of the same language by 4 percent after 19 years. See the statistics of Ethiopian nationalities of 1986]. The speakers of Gallah [Oromiffa], for example, are more numerous (44 percent) [this figure is greater than the number of the native speakers of the same  language by 14 percent after 19 years. See the statistics of the above mentioned year], than those of Amharic; yet their language falls under the proscribed languages (Fishman, 1968: 82).
Let us now examine the statistical method approach of modern language planning used by Kloss in order to identify the status of different language groups. Before taking some concrete examples, it is worth noticing the six standards of measurements for rank order (categories of numerical strength) of the native speakers of different languages.
I. Numerical Strength of the Native Speakers
90-100% (I)
70-89% (II)
40-69% (III)
20-39% (IV
-19% (V)
             Below 3% (VI)
For the convenience of thorough intelligibility of the combined symbols of tabulations, I have employed different signs: Roman Numbers (I, II, III, IV, V, VI), abbreviations (MsL, SgsL, AsL, YsL, UsL, PlL), alphabets (A, B, C, D, E, F) and Arabic Numbers (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) are used. The Roman Numbers stand for numerical category, the alphabets represent the stages of language development and the Arabic Numbers shows juridical or constitutional status.
II. Stages of Language Development (see previous definitions)
A. MsL- Mature standardized Language
B. SgsL- Small group standardized Language
C. AsL- Archaic standardized Language
D. YsL- Young standardized Language
E. UaL- Unstandardized alphabetized Language
F. PlL-Pre-literate Language

III. Constitutional or Juridical Status of Languages
1. SoL- The Sole official Language
2. CeL- Co-equal Language
3. RoL- Regional official Language 
4. PL- Promoted Language
5. TL- Tolerated Language
6. PrL-Proscribed Language
In order to understand the idea of numerical strength of the native speakers and combined symbol tabulations, I shall now try to illustrate the points with examples. Amharic is the mother tongue of 30 percent of the native speakers in Ethiopia. Oromiffa is the mother tongue of at least 55-60 percent of the native population in Ethiopia. In the table below, the status of Oromo language during the period of 1968, 1986 was 30-44%. Somali is natively spoken nearly by 90-100 percent of the population in Somalia. Thus, the linguistic characterization of the above languages can be analysed in the form of combined tabulation symbols (see next page).
Language planning is a government’s authorised, long-term, sustained and conscious effort to alter a language’s function in a society….Language policies, therefore, can promote, prescribe, discourage…the use of language and thereby empower or disempower speakers of languages by giving higher or lower status to their languages. Language policies are guided by particular ideologies or ultimate goals (Heine, 2000: 340-341). 
Status Symbols of Languages
Language
Country
Combined
Symbols
Stage of
Language
Development
Numerical
Strength/Total
Number of
Native Speaker
Juridical/
Constitutional
Status
Amharic
(During the periods of: 1910, 1952,
1968 & 1986)
Ethiopia
     D1
(23%-55.5%-I)
Young Standard
Language (D)
      23%-55.5%
The Sole
Official Language (1)
Oromiffa (During
the periods of:
1910, 1952, 1968
and 1986)
Ethiopia
     F6
(10.4%-44%
-II)
Pre-literate Language (F)
      18-%44%
Proscribed
Language (6)

Oromiffa (After
1992)
Ethiopia
     D3
(55%-60%-I)
Young Standard
Language (D)
      55%-60%
Regional Official
Language (3)
Somali
Somalia
     D1
(90%-100%-I)
Young Standard Language (D)
      90%-100%
The Sole
National Official
Language (1)
Table 1: Developmental Status, Juridical/Constitutional Status, Numerical Strength/Total Number
              of Native Speakers and Language Group Categories
Source: Joshua A. Fishman. Language Problems of Developing Nations, 1968;
             Encyclopædia Britanica, Ready Reference and Index, 15th Edition, volume 3,
              973-1974; Institute of the Study of Ethiopian Nationalities, 1986.
             Encyclopædia Britanica, Ready Reference and Index, 15th Edition, volume 3,
              973-1974; Institute of the Study of Ethiopian Nationalities, 1986.

The State Classified

         As we examine this language characterization model, there are two types of countries; namely the endoglossic nationality-state and exoglossic nationality-state. For example, in the case of Somalia, the only national official language of the country is natively spoken by the majority population. At the same time, we see that the Somalis are homogeneous. Thus, Somalia is endoglossic nationality-state. This means that it is also one of the homogeneous nationality-state in Africa. In the case of Ethiopia, however, the national official language of the country (Amharic) is not natively spoken by majority of the indigenous population, the Oromo; but has become the sole national official language. Oromiffa, language of the majority population, is doomed to prohibition. After 1991, though the status of Oromiffa is relatively improved, it is still unable to play the role of national official purposes because of the undefined language policy in the country. As it has already been mentioned earlier, Amharic language is actually the language of the ruling Amhara, who ruled the country until 1991, and has been imposed on the majority population, the Oromo, and other minority groups without considering any other option. Therefore, feudal and communist Ethiopia is characteristically all-exoglossic nationality-state. It is a country where totalitarian sovereignty and monolingual politics have reduced the Oromo and their language not only to nominal existence, but also distorted the entire image of the marginalized nation.

Genuine/Endoglossic Nation-State/Nationality-State and
Section-based/Subjection-Based Nation-State/Nationality-State
     Combined Symbols
                 Country’s Classification (Characteristic of a State)
1.   A+I+1 (AI1)
Genuine nation-state/nationality-state and Endoglossic nation-state/
nationality-state. A single-nationality-nation characterized by majority
rule (language of the majority is national official).
2.   A+II+1 (AII1)
Minority-based (section-based) nation-state/nationality-state and Conflict-based (subjection-based) nation-state/nationality-state. A multilingual state characterized by minority rule (language of the minority is an official language).
3.   A+III+1 (AIII1)
Minority-based (section-based) nation-state/nationality-state and Conflict-based (subjection-based) nation-state/nationality-state. A multilingual state characterized by minority rule (language of the minority is an official language).
4.   A+IV+1 (AIV1)
Minority-based (section-based) nation-state/nationality-state and Conflict-based (subjection-based) nation-state/nationality-state. A multilingual state characterized by minority rule (language of the minority is an official language).
5.   A+V+1 (AV1)
Minority-based (section-based) nation-state/nationality-state and Conflict-based (subjection-based) nation-state/nationality-state. A multilingual state characterized by minority rule (language of the minority is an official language).
6.   D+I+1 (DI1)
Minority-based (section-based) nation-state/nationality-state and Conflict-based (subjection-based) nation-state/nationality-state. A multilingual state marked by minority rule (language of the minority is an official language).
7.   D+II+1 (DII1)
Minority-based (section-based) nation-state/nationality-state and Conflict-based (subjection-based) nation-state/nationality-state. A multilingual state
characterized by minority rule (language of the minority is an official language).
8.   D+III+1 (DIII1)
Minority-based (section-based) nation-state/nationality-state and Conflict-based (subjection-based) nation-state/nationality-state. A multilingual state characterized by minority rule (language of the minority is an official language).

9.    D+IV+1 (DIV1)
Minority-based (section-based) nation-state/nationality-state and Conflict-based (subjection-based) nation-state/nationality-state. A multilingual state
dominated by the minority (language of the minority is an official language).
10.   D+V+1 (DV1)
Minority-based (section-based) nation-state/nationality-state and Conflict-based (subjection-based) nation-state/nationality-state. A multilingual state
marked by minority rule (language of the minority is an official language).
Table 1: Combined Status Symbols of Languages and Classification of States
Source: Joshua A. Fishman. Language Problems of Developing Nations, 1968.

          In developing nations of conflict model where traditional methods of ruling are exercised, great tradition often connotes ‘T. S. Eliot’s’ idea of the cultural and linguistic prestige of the dominant groups; and in a technical term to address a superior status, high values and importance of the tradition of empire-builders of the past. In terms of language policy, the idea of greatness is an intention to facilitate favourable condition for exercising dominance; and it is, therefore, necessary to avoid such ambiguity. The idea of having great tradition or without great tradition is basically contradictory to the modern concept of language planning and linguistic freedom because no nation is created without its own treasured values and qualities, though the hegemonic policy of Survival for the Fittest (Darwinian Theory) has promoted some groups to the level of masters and relegated the others to the level of subordination. In one sense, having or not having a great tradition in the context of prey and predator relations is an indication of appreciating inequality role relationships of people wherein those who are empowered continue enjoying lion’s share.
          In comparison to other developing nations, Africa is very much lagging behind the modern world mainly because of two reasons: first, lack of good governance and the problem of pacing up with the civilized world. Second, African scholars are unable to devise effective and democratic language policy. In general, the failure to meet the challenges in the continent has damaged African noble sentiment to bring about the development of African economy, languages and cultures. Africans have still clung themselves to the old colonial mannerisms and call for the adoption of the foreign languages and/or languages of the dominant groups as the national official by internalizing lower status given to them by the ex-colonial powers.
 For a while they [African nationalists] took pride in their command of the English language for reasons that were, paradoxically, nationalistic. But would not this put them English-speaking militants in the same category as Leopold Senghor with his affectionate attachment to the French language? And yet we have to describe Senghor’s Pride in the French language as at best a linguistic cosmopolitanism. What makes it possible for these early English-speaking Africans to be “nationalists” in spite of revelling in English language? (Fishman, 1968: 185).
This is a warning against imitative complex. Senghor believes that French is the supreme language of communication, rather than his own mother tongue. Some African intellectuals and scholars are still the prisoners of such wrong impressions. Education and the quality of intellect to many educated Africans simply mean the ability to speak and write English or French. Some Oromo scholars have also similar problems. It seems, however, self-diminishing for those intellectuals who assert their capacity by seeking solace and comfort in the non-native languages and cultures. The notion of clinging to languages of the dominant segments as the source of salvation, the most refined and valuable African asset is contrary to modern civilization, democracy, the principle of pluralistic moderation and nation-building. Africans cannot and will not grow better as long as they keep on fighting for the perpetual domination of languages of mental control. Most of all, whoever demonstrates a good command of foreign languages is always the best person to be rewarded. The traditional belief about language politics and the continuity of the admiration of the dominant tradition by the states have not only hampered the development of indigenous African languages, but also prevented the African masses from deciding their own destiny. Using the imposed languages as permanent features in Africa has resulted in prolonging neo-colonialism and dependency of all times.
From Japan: What is merely modern-as science and methods of organization-can be transported, but what is virtually human has fibres, so delicate and roots so numerous and far-reaching that it dies when moved from its soil. Japan…cannot be turned into a mere borrowed machine. She has her own soil which must assert itself over all…. Our Imperial Ancestors have founded our empire on a basis of broad and everlasting, and have deeply and firmly implanted virtue. Our subjects, ever united in loyalty and filial piety, have from generation to generation illustrated the beauty thereof. This is the glory of the fundamental character of our empire (Fishman, 1989: 138-139).Fishman (1985: 138) has also made similar remarks and said that the Arabs want modernization, but they have no desire to lose their own identity in the process.
         In order to function as a truly national symbol, a language has to win a willing acceptance of different ethnic groups of a country. “In India, English was supposed to be replaced by Hindi fifteen years after independence. However, because of vehement opposition by non-Hindi speaking groups, the requirement was suspended through the Language Legislation Act of 1967” (Bamgbose, 1991: 22). In a democratic type of language planning, the most important thing is to avoid the concept of imposing a language of a certain group arbitrarily on other people as a symbol of unity. This means without a genuine study of the function of languages, identity representation in education and culture can never happen. Hence, it is of vital significance to carry out a thorough scientific study of each language by means of using language development indices and other semantic dimensions. The scientific study of language must involve: orthography, dictionary, grammar, the total population of the native and non-native speakers of the language, literary and religious uses of the language and how far it is used as medium of instruction in schools (elementary, secondary or higher educational levels) and its strength of being used in mass media and publications (books, newspapers, letters, magazines, radio and television); its capacity to translate technological ideas and scientific terms in research; its level of standardization: mature standardized, adolescent, young standardized, reduced to the level of writing (only alphabetized), unalphabetized but spoken, etc (see W. Ferguson 1962, W. Stewart 1968, Heinz Kloss and Joshua A. Fishman, 1968). Besides this, what makes a language the ‘symbol of unity’ is whether or not that language is attached to the history, socio-cultural life, national identity and other values of the people concerned.

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